Equal Is an Option, Not a Presumption: Supreme Court of Kentucky Reverses

Dall v. Dall, No. 2025-SC-0077-DG (Ky. 2026)

Marital Property: equitable division; equalization
KRS 403.190(1): statutory factors
KRS 403.200(1): maintenance

Dated: October 22, 2026
Reversing and Remanding
To Be Published

Editor’s Note: You can read our previous summary for the appeal in this case here.

The Supreme Court said not everything has to be divided 50/50. The justices split 5–2 just to prove the point.

In a 5–2 decision in Dall v. Dall, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reaffirmed that an equal division of marital property is permissible, but cannot be presumed. KRS 403.190(1) requires trial courts to divide marital property in “just proportions” after considering the statutory factors, including each spouse’s contribution to its acquisition. The Court concluded that the family court abused its discretion by relying on legislative intent to presume that an equal division was appropriate, rather than applying the statute as written. Because that presumption formed the basis of the property division, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

The decision also addresses a separate issue with significant implications for spousal maintenance in Kentucky: the threshold requirements for an award of maintenance under KRS 403.200(1), discussed more fully below.

Facts

The parties were married for 38 years. At the time of the marriage, Husband had a degree in chemistry and worked as a quality control chemist. Wife had a college degree in accounting. The parties earned comparable salaries at that time.

The parties raised two children during the marriage. They relocated frequently among different states as Wife moved up the corporate ladder at various companies. When Wife received promotions or new jobs, Husband resigned from his jobs to facilitate the relocation. Eventually, Husband stayed home by agreement of the parties while Wife focused on her career. At the time of the dissolution trial, the marital estate was valued at $19,158,834. Wife’s annual salary was $800,000 plus additional compensation. Husband was 65 years of age and had no employment income of his own at the time of trial. Husband and Wife agreed in 2002 that Husband would serve as a stay-at-home father, and Husband had not been employed since 2002.

Overall Division of the Marital Estate

Regarding the property division generally, Wife sought a 60/40 split of the marital assets, and Husband requested an equal division of the marital estate.

First, the trial court found that Wife’s post-separation contributions to the marital estate constituted marital property. The trial court stated that under Kentucky law, “property is deemed marital unless proven otherwise, and must be divided and valued as of the date of decree,” citing Shively v. Shively, 233 S.W.3d 738 (Ky. App. 2007).

Next, the trial court concluded that the only way to ensure an equitable distribution of the entire marital estate was to divide it equally between the parties.  The trial court concluded that “in situations such as the one at bar where the parties enter their union and operate as a functioning, commingled unit over time, the Court believes the intention [of KRS 403.190] is to separate the parties and their accumulated assets/debts equally and restore them to the status of single individuals. In this way, both parties leave the marriage in the same position, with neither gaining an advantage or disadvantage as a result of the decision to go their separate ways.”

Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s equal division of marital property, including Wife’s post-separation compensation and the increased value of the marital residence. The Court of Appeals opined that the trial court sufficiently considered the factors enumerated in KRS 403.190(1), and that its discussion of the legislative intent underlying the statute, while unnecessary, did not amount to an abuse of discretion requiring reversal. It affirmed the division of the marital estate, with certain relatively minor issues remanded.

Wife appealed to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, arguing that the trial court erroneously divided the marital property equally under the mistaken belief that the governing statute presumes an equal division of assets in certain factual scenarios. She also contended that the trial court erred in equally dividing marital assets acquired post-separation, which were attributable to Wife’s employment compensation.

The Court stated that statutory interpretation is a matter of law, subject to de novo review, citing Ford v. Perkins, 382 S.W.3d 821 (Ky. 2012). The Court also stated that abuse of discretion is the standard of review for a trial court’s division of marital property. Thielmeier v. Thielmeier, 664 S.W.3d 563, 573 (Ky. 2022). [Editor’s Note: You can read our Thielmeier appeal post here, and the resolution from the Supreme Court of Kentucky here.] The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

At trial, Wife argued that she was entitled to a larger portion (60%) of the marital estate because her earnings contributed more than Husband’s earnings. She further asserted that Husband had made no appreciable contribution to the marital estate since 2012, the year both children were emancipated and ceased residing in the marital home. She also argued that the trial court was prohibited from construing the statute beyond its plain meaning.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky agreed that the trial court’s interpretation of KRS 403.190(1) was error. The statute says that marital property must be divided in “just proportions” after consideration of “all relevant factors including”:

1. Contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital property, including contribution of a spouse as homemaker;

2. Value of the property set apart to each spouse;

3. Duration of the marriage; and

4. Economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of any children.

Because KRS 403.190(1) is unambiguous, courts must apply its plain language rather than resort to legislative intent. The Supreme Court reiterated that Kentucky law does not presume a 50/50 division of marital property without regard to the evidence. Citing Herron v. Herron, 573 S.W.2d 342 (Ky. 1978), the Court emphasized that trial courts must divide marital property according to the statutory factors.

Here, the family court found that Husband’s decision not to work after the children were emancipated did not “affect his right to an equal division of the marital estate.” The Supreme Court concluded that the family court had not independently evaluated the factors under KRS 403.190(1), but had instead relied on the erroneous presumption that marital property should be divided equally. The case was therefore remanded for a proper application of the statutory factors.

Division of Post-Separation Marital Property

At trial, Wife sought to exclude from the marital estate more than $7 million in post-separation increases in value and acquisitions. The post-separation property included the increased value of the marital home, a checking account funded solely by Wife’s employment earnings, and Wife’s deferred stock holdings. Wife claimed at trial that the post-separation property was non-marital.

Under Kentucky law, property acquired after physical separation and before entry of the dissolution decree is considered marital property unless an exception under KRS 403.190(2) applies. Wife argued that the trial court erred in awarding Husband a 50% share of these assets without consideration as to whether Husband provided a continuing contribution to the acquisition of these assets.

KRS 403.190(2) provides that property acquired subsequent to a marriage is marital property, except, among other things, property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation or property excluded by agreement of the parties. On this point, physical or actual separation is not the equivalent of legal separation granted by a decree. Stallings v. Stallings, 606 S.W.2d 163, 164 (Ky. 1980).

The issue of the division of the post-separation property was moot because the case was remanded to the trial court for a new property division analysis. However, the Supreme Court did comment on Wife’s claimed error in order to provide guidance to the trial court.

Wife argued that the trial court was required to identify Husband’s continuing contributions that assisted Wife in earning her post-separation compensation, which in turn increased the value of the marital estate. Analyzing prior cases on this subject, the Supreme Court concluded that the law does not require the trial court to afford any specific factor “decisive weight.” It held that the trial court maintains wide discretion in dividing marital property, and that the trial court may consider and weigh Husband’s tangible and intangible contributions during the marriage, some of which may have helped Wife earn compensation during the parties’ separation. The Court found that there is no precedential authority placing decisive weight on a spouse’s contributions, or lack thereof, during the parties’ physical separation.

Spousal Maintenance

The family court awarded Husband spousal maintenance of $15,000 per month until Wife reaches age 65 or retires, whichever comes later. Wife argued that the trial court failed to make the required findings pursuant to KRS 403.200(1).

The Supreme Court pointed out that since the trial court was already being instructed to reevaluate the division of marital property upon remand, the spousal maintenance order must also be reassessed. However, the Court went on to remind the trial court that, before evaluating the amount and duration of spousal maintenance, the trial court must first find that Husband lacked sufficient property, including marital property, to provide for his reasonable needs and is unable to support himself through appropriate employment. The Court emphasized the language of KRS 403.200(1):

In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation … the court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse only if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:

(a) Lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs, and

(b) Is unable to support himself through appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home. (emphasis added by the Supreme Court).

The Court held that on remand, the trial court must provide findings and conclusions as to the required spousal maintenance criteria, including whether Husband can provide for himself through appropriate employment, and whether Husband’s share of the marital estate may provide for his reasonable needs.

The Dissent

Justice Thompson, joined by Justice Keller, dissented. The dissent viewed the family court’s discussion of legislative intent as unnecessary language rather than evidence that it had improperly presumed an equal division of marital property. The dissent concluded that the family court had acted within its discretion and would have upheld both the property division and the maintenance award.

Conclusion

Dall v. Dall does not establish a new rule of law. Rather, it reinforces two existing principles of Kentucky family law: (1) an equal division of marital property is permissible, but cannot be presumed; and (2) courts must make the findings required by KRS 403.200(1) before awarding spousal maintenance.

Importantly, the family court may still divide the marital estate equally on remand, including post-separation assets, if that division is supported by the statutory factors. The court may also award the same $15,000 in monthly maintenance, provided it first determines that Husband satisfies the threshold requirements of KRS 403.200(1) and then determines the appropriate amount and duration.

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