Kentucky Case Law Review by Topic: April 1, 2026 through May 31, 2026

Loveless v. Loveless, No. 2025-CA-0478-MR (Ky. App. 2026)

Property Settlement Agreement: Civ. R. 60.02 (fraud)

Dated: April 3, 2026
Affirming
Not to be published

Wife filed a motion to vacate the final divorce decree issued May 2019, pursuant to Civ. R. 60.02. The parties were married in 1985. A property settlement agreement was incorporated in the decree of divorce. Wife received a one-half interest in the marital home and permission to continue living there, and Husband agreed to pay all the utilities while Wife lived in the home. Wife also received half of the current value of Husband’s profit-sharing and savings plan from his employer.

Husband remarried, and he died in 2022. After the funeral, Husband’s brother told relatives that Husband had loaned him $70,000 to buy property, and that he had repaid Husband in cash before he died. Wife heard about this and filed a motion to vacate the divorce decree, with the aim of reopening the divorce so she could pursue a claim against Husband’s estate. She alleged that Husband concealed approximately $225,800 from her by diverting funds to his siblings and a friend, that he kept large amounts of cash on hand at his home, and that he did not report these funds on his financial disclosure statement.

The trial court denied the motion to vacate, and Wife appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

The decision to grant or deny a motion filed pursuant to Civ. R. 60.02 is wholly within a trial court’s discretion, and rulings are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Additionally, relief pursuant to Civ. R. 60.02 is an extraordinary remedy which should be cautiously granted.

Wife alleged in her appeal that a “cabal” of Husband’s relatives and friends colluded to defraud her from receiving her fair share of marital property. However, the sole question on appeal was whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the motion to vacate.

Civ. R 60.02 provides that a court may relieve a party or his legal representative from its final judgment only upon the following limited grounds: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Civ. R. 59.02; (c) perjury or falsified evidence; (d) fraud affecting the proceedings, other than perjury or falsified evidence; (e) the judgment is void, or has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (f) any other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief.

Wife’s allegations would ordinarily fall under Civ. R. 60.02(c). However, motions under Civ. R. 60.02(c) must be made no more than one year after the entry of the final judgment. Since the divorce was entered in 2019, a motion under Civ. R. 60.02(c) would be time-barred. Therefore, Wife sought relief under Civ. R. 60.02(d), fraud affecting the proceedings, other than perjury or falsified evidence. This motion is required to be filed “within a reasonable time.”

Discoverability and circumstances of the alleged fraud are relevant factors for a court to consider before granting relief under Civ. R. 60.02(d). The law demands the exercise of due diligence. Courts are loath to grant relief pursuant to Civ. R. 60.02 on grounds that were known or could have been ascertained by due diligence prior to the entry of final judgment.

Here, Husband’s alleged fraud was not particularly complex, and it centered around underreporting his marital assets. It was ascertainable, and Wife also knew that Husband failed to report a hidden money market account. (This account was made a part of the property settlement agreement at the time of the divorce.) There were many red flags present relating to Husband’s penchant for underreporting and operating with traceless cash.

Furthermore, prior to the divorce hearing recess, Wife testified that she had always been aware that Husband routinely kept large sums of cash on hand, yet she never questioned the fact that Husband did not disclose any cash on hand in his financial disclosure statement. Being aware of fraudulent tendencies serves to put a reasonable person on notice that heightened scrutiny might be warranted.

Also, at least two of the people Wife suspected of subterfuge were present at the divorce trial and could have been called to testify. Wife had both the time and the opportunity to raise the issues at trial, but she chose not to do so. The trial court took note of all these factors in denying Wife’s Civ. R. 60.02 motion. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.

Wells v. Wells, No. 21-CI-00133, 2024-CA-1327-MR (Ky. App. 2026)

KRS 403.190: (1)(a) contributions of each spouse
Marital Property: disclosure, division, tax refund
Property Settlement Agreement

Dated: April 17, 2026
Affirming
Not to be Published

The parties married in 2009, separated in October 2021, and Wife petitioned for divorce the following month. In December 2021, the trial court ordered that the parties would have joint custody and equal timesharing of their three minor children. Wife would receive $5,000/month in temporary maintenance, and no temporary child support was ordered.

The parties entered into a settlement agreement which was incorporated into the divorce decree in November 2023. Among other provisions, Wife received a $500,000 lump sum settlement for her maintenance, property rights, and other claims, while Husband retained substantial business interests. The agreement further (incorrectly) stated that the parties had filed joint federal and state income tax returns through 2022, with Husband responsible for any taxes due.

In February 2024, Husband moved for an order requiring Wife to sign 2022 federal and state income tax returns, prepared by the parties’ accountant. The returns showed that Husband had made estimated tax payments which resulted in nearly $212,000.00 in overpayments. Husband sought the entirety of the overpayments, noting the substantial settlement paid to Wife already and ongoing maintenance throughout the tax year. Wife, Husband argued, had no entitlement to the refund, because she had not contributed to the estimated tax payments.

In response, Wife stated that she had not known about the overpayments when she entered into the settlement agreement, and suggested Husband’s overpayments were an attempt to conceal funds from her. An evidentiary hearing was held in March 2024, during which the trial court declined to consider testimony concerning Wife’s contributions as a homemaker prior to separation, which was included in the record by avowal, only.

In a ruling that followed, the trial court determined that the tax overpayments were marital property, and subject to division. Because the overpayments had not been addressed in the parties’ agreement, the trial court was required to divide them in just proportions under KRS 403.190. Husband was awarded 95% of the overpayments, and Wife 5% ($10,600).

In her appeal, Wife argued that the trial court failed to divide the property in just proportions, particularly because it refused to consider evidence concerning her contributions as a homemaker before the parties separated. She also argued that the division effectively rewarded Husband for concealing the funds, and worsened the economic disparity between the parties.

The Court first noted that property acquired after the parties’ separation—but prior to a decree of separation or the termination of marriage—is presumed marital. However, relying on Shively v. Shively, 233 S.W.3d 738 (Ky. App. 2007), the Court further explained that marital property acquired after an actual separation need not be divided in the same proportions as property acquired before separation. Rather, a trial court must ensure that marital property is divided in “just proportions” after consideration of the factors in KRS 403.190.

The Court found that the trial court adequately considered the KRS 403.190 factors, in dividing the overpayments. Husband, the Court noted, had made all of the payments which ‘acquired’ the marital property (satisfying the first factor). Further, the overpayments were made while the parties were separated, exercising equal timesharing of their children, both employed, and maintaining separate finances. Wife also received $5,000/month in temporary maintenance, while Husband paid other expenses on her behalf.

The trial court likewise considered the value of the property received by each party, in its application of KRS 403.190 factors, as well as the 14-year marriage, and the parties’ economic circumstances. While Husband’s financial circumstances were more favorable than Wife’s, Wife had received substantial assets under the parties’ agreement. Thus, the Court concluded, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a 95/5 division of the tax overpayments.

The Court rejected Wife’s suggestion that Husband had concealed the overpayments. The trial court had found that Husband and his businesses historically obtained extensions for filing their tax returns and that the businesses distributed funds to Husband for payment of estimated taxes. The trial court deemed Husband’s testimony credible, which finding the Court held was entitled to deference on appeal.

Finally, the Court held that any error in excluding Wife’s testimony concerning her contributions as a homemaker prior to separation, was harmless. The Court declined to decide whether, under different circumstances, a trial court could consider a spouse’s pre-separation contributions when dividing marital property acquired post-separation.

Holden v. Holden, No. 11-CI-503722, 2025-CA-1064-MR (Ky App. 2026)

Marital Property: Retirement benefits (military)
Attorney Fees

Dated: April 24, 2026
Affirming
Not to be published

In this post-dissolution case, Husband challenged an order granting Wife attorney’s fees following litigation over the division of Husband’s military pension. During the marriage, Husband was a pilot with the United States Air Force. The first agreed order, entered in 2014, clarified that Husband would participate in the Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) to provide continued income to Wife in the event of his death. Wife agreed to pay the monthly premiums for the SBP.

A second agreed order, filed in 2015, clarified that Husband was prohibited from taking any action that would reduce or limit Wife’s monthly entitlement to her share of the military pension. Husband began receiving his military pension in 2021.

A dispute arose over the way Husband’s pension was calculated and disbursed by DFAS, and whether Wife owed Husband reimbursement for SBP premiums withheld from Husband’s monthly pension benefits. (The SBP premiums had been withheld from Husband’s portion of the pension check pursuant to DFAS accounting policy, notwithstanding the parties’ agreement Wife would pay the premiums.)

Wife filed a motion alleging that Husband violated the 2015 order by electing deductions for a VA waiver and debt repayment fees. Husband filed a competing motion for reimbursement of the SBP premiums. After lengthy litigation, the trial court entered an order in 2024 adopting Wife’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in their entirety. Husband appealed. The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the 2024 order because the matter was deemed too complicated for the trial court to delegate to trial counsel responsibility for drafting findings of fact and conclusions of law as an administrative convenience. The trial court was directed to craft its own detailed findings and independent conclusions.

In December of 2024, while Husband’s appeal of the 2024 order was pending, Wife filed a motion for attorney’s fees based on the substantial disparity of income between the parties and Husband’s alleged uncooperative conduct during the military pension litigation. At a hearing on the matter, they agreed to exchange tax returns and submit the matter to the trial court for resolution after briefs were filed and tax returns were exchanged.

The trial court ordered husband to pay $5,000.00 for attorney’s fees. Relying on the language of KRS 403.220, the family court in a succinct decision found that reasonable attorney’s fees were appropriate because Husband earned more than Wife. KRS 403.220 states:

The court from time to time after considering the financial resources of both parties may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter and for attorney’s fees, including sums for legal services rendered and costs incurred prior to the commencement of the proceeding or after entry of judgment. The court may order that the amount be paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in his name.

Husband, a commercial pilot, had annual income of $415,000. Wife, a real estate agent, had fluctuating income but her 2023 tax return showed income of $67,000. The trial court made no finding that Husband engaged in misconduct during the litigation.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky held in Smith v. McGill, 556 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Ky. 2018), that financial disparity is no longer a threshold requirement which must be met in order for a trial court to award attorney’s fees. However, financial disparity is still a viable factor for trial courts to consider in awarding attorney’s fees.

The Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to Wife. It noted that “the dispute was largely about choices made by Husband about deductions to his retirement…. Wife had to litigate to protect [her interest].” The Court held that Husband was earning six times what Wife earned, and that it was in no way unfair for the trial court to order Husband to pay Wife $5,000 for attorney’s fees.

Finally, the Court pointed out that although there is case law supporting an award of attorney’s fees upon a finding of both misconduct and disparity in income, the clear language of the statute requires only that the trial court consider the financial resources of the parties and nothing else:

By removing the threshold requirement of finding a disparity of income in Smith, Kentucky courts are now free to award fees where there has been misconduct or obstructive litigation tactics as between parties with similar incomes. But the plain language of the statute, and the status of Kentucky case law, still allows the court to award attorney’s fees based solely on consideration of the financial condition of the parties, even without a finding of misconduct.

Link v. Koch, No. 24-CI-500927, 2025-CA-0863-MR (Ky App. 2026)

Marital Property: Separate Property; tracing; valuation (home)

Dated: May 8, 2026
Affirming
Not to be published

The parties were married in November 2018. Sixteen months before the marriage, Husband purchased a home. Based on disclosure forms submitted by the parties, the trial court determined that at the time of trial, the real estate had a value of $192,280 and a mortgage of $114,390, with $77,890 in equity. The parties were married for approximately six years.

The trial court found that Husband presented no evidence regarding whether he put a down payment on the property, mortgaged the entire amount, or something in between. Husband also provided no information at trial regarding the value of the property at the time of the marriage. The closest valuation date provided was the purchase price, $140,000, in July 2016. The trial court said, “[A]dopting the current value provided by [Husband] of $192,280, the house has increased in value by $52,280.”

The trial court determined that since Husband did not prove otherwise, the increase in the home’s value must be assumed to be a marital portion of the nonmarital residence owned by Husband at the time of the divorce. The trial court awarded Wife $26,140, representing half of the appreciation of the real estate during the marriage.

Husband appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that the increase in value of the real estate was divisible marital property. He asserted that the evidence was clear that he purchased the property prior to marriage, and that there was no evidence that Wife contributed to any increase in value. The Court held that Husband’s argument “improperly shifts his burden, a burden he failed to meet.”

The Court stated that under KRS 403.190(2)(e), marital property excludes the increase in value of property acquired before the marriage to the extent that such increase did not result from the efforts of the parties during the marriage. Conversely, an increase in value of property that did result from the efforts of the parties during the marriage should be considered marital property. Croft v. Croft, 240 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Ky App. 2007). Stated another way, when the value of nonmarital property is enhanced using marital funds, the increase in value of the property and the funds contributed in pursuit of that increase are subject to division as marital property. Smith v. Smith, 497 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Ky. App. 1973).

The Court noted that it is critically important to remember that the party claiming that the increase in value is to be considered nonmarital has the burden of proving it, and that failure to do so will result in the increase being characterized as marital property. Travis v. Travis, 59 S.W.3d 904, 911 (Ky. 2001).

In its analysis, the Court of Appeals stated that the trial court did determine that the real property was nonmarital, but that the increase in value of the property was marital. Sixteen months prior to the marriage, Husband purchased the property for $140,000, and Husband’s own valuation of the fair market value of the property at the time of trial was $192,280.

The trial court noted that Husband did not provide any information regarding the value of the property at the time of the marriage, payments he made toward the mortgage, nor any testimony regarding general economic conditions or any other reason that might have caused the property to appreciate in value.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that when property acquired during the marriage includes an increase in the value of an asset containing both marital and nonmarital components, trial courts must determine from the evidence why the increase in value occurred. Further, there is a presumption that any such increase in value is a result of the joint efforts of the parties. Travis, 59 S.W.3rd at 910.

Kentucky’s Court of Appeals has specifically applied the holding in Travis to assets purchased before the marriage. Croft, 240 S.W.3d 651. The Croft court held that, even with assets purchased prior to the marriage, any increase in value will be presumed marital.

Ultimately, Husband had the burden of proving that the equity in the marital residence was nonmarital. It was not enough that Husband purchased the home prior to the marriage. The failure to meet this burden resulted in the increase in value being characterized as marital property. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Brewington v. Brewington, No. 23-CI-00006, 2025-CA-0482-MR (Ky. App. 2026)

Attorney Fees
Marital Property: retirement benefits
Property Settlement Agreement
QDRO

Dated: May 22, 2026
Affirming
Not to be Published

The parties entered into an agreed mediation order in their divorce action. Husband was to retain the marital home, remove Wife from the mortgage, and pay her $10,000. Husband was also to receive half of Wife’s Kentucky Teachers’ Retirement System (KTRS) plan payments upon entry of a separate QDRO. The trial court entered a QDRO the following month. Correspondence in the record indicated that KTRS initially rejected the QDRO because Husband’s attorney failed to comply with certain statutory requirements.

Months later, Wife moved to compel Husband to pay the $10,000 and requested reimbursement of her attorney fees. Husband argued that Wife had effectively received the payment because she continued receiving full KTRS payments after the initial entry of the QDRO. By Husband’s undocumented estimate, Wife had received $12,400 that should have been paid to him. The trial court faulted Husband for the problems with the KTRS payments and ordered him to pay Wife the $10,000 and $2,000 in attorney fees. Husband appealed.

The Court explained that a trial court had authority to enforce its own judgments and remove obstructions to enforcement. The Court was required to defer to the trial court’s interpretation of its own orders unless that interpretation was manifestly unreasonable. It found that the order was not manifestly unreasonable.

The Court emphasized that the appeal concerned an order compelling Husband to comply with an unambiguous term of the agreed mediation order. It did not concern the disposition of any motion by Husband seeking adjudication of his separate claim regarding the QDRO or KTRS payments. The Court stated:

A party who believes his legal opponent is failing to comply with an order has more than the right to present the issue to the trial court; he has the duty to do so. Self-help solutions ignore the whole purpose for presenting disputes to an objective arbiter.

The Court rejected Husband’s attempt to use the pension dispute as a defense to Wife’s motion. Raising a separate issue in this manner deprived Wife of a proper opportunity to defend against it. Husband’s belief that Wife was responsible for the defective QDRO and the delay in his receipt of pension payments did not excuse his failure to pay the $10,000 without a trial court order authorizing that relief. He was required to seek such an order by motion rather than resort to a self-help remedy. The trial court’s order was affirmed.

Blog Posts are intended to bring attention to developments in the law and are not intended as legal advice for any particular client or any particular situation. Please consult with counsel of your choice regarding any specific questions you may have.