Ohio Case Law Review by Topic: April 1, 2026 through May 31, 2026

Nichols v. Nichols, 4th Dist. Pike No. 25CA 937, 2026-Ohio-1445

Marital Property: subject matter jurisdiction

Dated: April 8, 2026
Reversing and Remanding

The parties were married in 2005. At trial, both parties requested an equitable division of marital property and allocation of parental rights for their two minor children. The parties owned two homes, one in Ohio and one in Virginia.

The divorce trial was held on September 8, 2023. Both parties were represented by counsel. The trial court made its equitable division of marital property and shared parenting determinations.

Wife filed a muti-branch motion after the divorce trial which related to insurance proceeds, motor vehicles, a riding mower, and medical expenses. She also requested a modification of the parenting time schedule. Husband filed a countermotion for contempt. The motions were set for hearing. Husband appeared without counsel. The trial court granted four branches of Wife’s motion and Husband appealed.

Husband set forth three assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in revaluing and distributing property as it lacked jurisdiction;

2. The trial court erred in failing to grant a continuance; and

3. The trial court erred in ruling on Wife’s motion without proper service on Husband.

The Court considered the service issue first. Husband was represented by counsel when the motion was filed, and a copy of the motion was sent to his attorney in accordance with Civ.R. 5(B)(1). Service was also attempted on Husband at one of the homes owned by the parties at the time of the divorce. Information regarding Husband’s residence was conflicting before and after the divorce decree was issued. When Wife filed her motion, Husband had two criminal charges pending and court records indicated his address as 2060 Schuster Road, Piketon, Ohio. However, Husband contended that 2060 Schuster Road was not his residence.

The Court overruled the third assignment of error. Husband appeared for the hearing on the motion. Husband testified that the motion was “sent to the wrong address,” however he also acknowledged receiving a copy of the motion. The Court stated:

The record is replete with evidence that service at 2060 Schuster Road was reasonably calculated to reach Husband and give him an opportunity to respond.

The Court observed that when Husband filed his motion, he listed 2060 Schuster Road as his address. Husband also filed a previous pleading in which he stated that he actively managed and oversaw the property.

The Court found that the trial court was in the best position to determine Husband’s credibility, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding proper service.

The Court then addressed assignment number two, the continuance issue. Husband did not actually make a written or verbal motion to continue the post-decree hearing. Both parties were present for the hearing. The court asked Husband if he planned to retain counsel, and he replied, “I would love to.” However, Husband did not request a continuance or voice any suggestion that could be construed as an objection for the hearing to proceed. Husband had time to retain counsel after he received a copy of the motion, and nothing prevented him from doing so.

The Court held that in the final analysis, Husband never requested a continuance, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit plain error in failing to perceive a motion for continuance in Husband’s communications with the court.

Finally, the Court agreed with Husband that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make orders changing the equitable division of marital assets. The case was reversed and remanded on these grounds.

Once a court has made an equitable property division, it has no jurisdiction to modify its decision. Martin v. Howard, 2009-Ohio-67, citing R.C. 3105.171(I). While the trial court can clarify and construe its original property division to effectuate its judgment, it may not vary from, enlarge, or diminish the relief embodied in the final decree.

In her post-decree motion, Wife asked the trial court to make orders regarding the sale or delivery of certain motor vehicles. The parties owned 13 vehicles at the time of trial. All the vehicles were ordered to be sold, and the proceeds divided equally. However, in a subsequent judgment entry the court

made a finding regarding the value of two of the motor vehicles and ordered each party to retain one of them.

The Court found that the original order regarding the motor vehicles was not ambiguous, and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to change the way the motor vehicles were to be divided between the parties. The Court cited, among other cases, Thomas v. Thomas, 2001 WL 422967, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1883, 10th Dist., which held “The divorce decree is not ambiguous because the trial court failed to award the defendant interest on her pension distribution when it could have done so.”

In other words, the trial court impermissibly modified its prior order by assigning new values and ordering Wife to take possession of one of the vehicles. The case was therefore reversed and remanded.

Leary v. Leary, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 30471, 2021 AN 00012, 2026-Ohio-1396

Attorney Fees: abuse of discretion
Marital Property: equitable division (unequal division of debts), de facto date (marriage) (termination of marriage), debts, distributive award, financial misconduct, separate property

Dated: April 17, 2026
Reversing in Part and Affirming in Part

The parties began cohabiting in May 2021, and married the following July. In the short period after they moved in together, but prior to their marriage, Husband resigned his employment and liquidated various accounts including: $35,441 from a Thrift Savings Plan account, $22,036 from a Roth IRA, and $13,350 from a credit union account. The funds were placed in a newly-opened joint checking account with Wife, and subsequently transferred almost in their entirety to an account in Wife’s name only.

Husband was prompted to leave his job by Wife, who was concerned his income would impact her social security benefits. Wife was unemployed, and the mother of five children. Wife later alleged she had not pressured Husband to resign, and that she was still attempting to resolve her benefits when he did.

In June 2021, Husband traded in his smaller vehicle toward a minivan for both parties’ use. But the car functioned poorly, and was later sold by Wife. Wife utilized $40,145 of the funds she’d transferred out of the joint account (totaling $92,942 as of 06/17/2021) to pay off the loan on a Toyota Sienna. In September 2021, Husband financed several purchases benefiting Wife, her children, or her property, including: $799 for children’s clothing, $5,145 for a dog, $2,490 for carports and sheds, and $1,921 for necklaces for a friend of Wife.

The parties’ marriage rapidly deteriorated, and Wife filed for an annulment in December 2021. Husband was kicked out of the residence the following January.

The trial court determined that, for purposes of dividing the parties’ property, the marriage ran from May 2021 (when the parties began living together) through January 2022. It found that Wife had committed financial misconduct and ordered a distributive award of $58,827 to Husband. The award represented Husband’s dissipated pre-marital accounts, totaling $70,827, less $12,000 in estimated living expenses he otherwise would have incurred during the 8-month marriage. Wife was assigned responsibility for most of the marital debt, and was ordered to pay $3,000 in attorney’s fees to Husband.

Wife’s first appeal was dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order. After the decree was entered in May 2025, Wife appealed again. In her first assignment of error, Wife argued that the trial court abused its discretion in the award of attorney’s fees to Husband. The Court agreed, noting that a party seeking an award of fees bears the burden of proof, and must provide evidence of their reasonable and necessary expenses. Husband provided no such evidence during the proceedings. While in some cases a trial court may award attorney’s fees based on the conduct of the parties, the Court continued, “’the record must reasonably demonstrate some nexus between the amount of fees awarded pursuant to R.C. 3105.73(A) and the particular conduct for which the award is made.’ Feldmiller v. Feldmiller, 2012-Ohio-4621 ¶ 73 (2d Dist.), citing Janis v. Janis, 2011-Ohio-3731 (2d Dist.).” The trial court also exceeded the $1,000 amount then considered prima facie reasonable under the applicable local rule without conducting a fee hearing.

In her next assignment of error, Wife alleged that the trial court erred in granting the divorce on grounds of financial misconduct, which is not a statutory ground for divorce. Overruling Wife, the Court found that the trial court’s error was harmless, and that both parties had testified that they were incompatible and requested a divorce, thereby establishing a proper statutory basis for terminating the marriage.

Wife next argued that the trial court erred in the award of $58,827 to Husband, based on financial transactions that occurred before the marriage, in its finding of financial misconduct, and assignment of marital debt. The Court addressed these claims together.

While the presumed duration of a marriage is between the date of marriage through the final hearing, a trial court may utilize other, de facto dates if it finds that using the presumed duration would be inequitable. The Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it used May 2021 as the de facto marriage beginning date. By that time, the parties were cohabiting, financially entangled, and had initiated IVF treatments in anticipation of starting a family. Husband had placed nearly all of his financial assets under Wife’s control, quit his employment, and become financially dependent. The Court likewise upheld January 2022 as the de facto marriage end date because the parties had separated, no longer shared finances, and made no effort to reconcile.

Reviewing for manifest weight of the evidence, the Court also affirmed the distributive award to Husband, and finding of financial misconduct by Wife. Wife argued that the trial court’s findings were based on pre-marital transactions and thus outside the scope of ORC 3105.171(E)(4). But having affirmed the trial court’s use of a de facto term of marriage, the Court found that such transactions had occurred during the marriage. Next, Wife claimed that the trial court’s finding of financial misconduct was unsupported by evidence. She alleged that Husband voluntarily liquidated his assets and gave her access to the funds. The Court disagreed, deferring to the trial court’s witness credibility findings, and noting a significant record of unilateral transfers and deceptive behavior by Wife (including her sale of the Toyota minivan during the proceedings, and representation to the trial court at the time that the vehicle was her separate pre-marital property). The Court found ample evidence that Wife had intentionally defeated Husband’s interest in his separate property. Her conduct therefore supported a distributive award under the trial court’s equitable authority and the financial-misconduct provisions of ORC 3105.171.

Finally, the Court also affirmed the unequal allocation of marital debt, which had been incurred at Wife’s request, primarily benefited her or her children, and remained unpaid despite Wife’s control of the parties’ funds and continued payments of debts and accounts in her own name. Wife alone retained the benefit of, or disposed of, the purchased property. Thus, and in view of Wife’s “blatant, rampant financial misconduct,” the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assigning an unequal division of the marital debts.

Packer v. Packer, 12th Dist. Clermont No. 25CA 2025-04-034, 2026-Ohio-1417

Marital Property: valuation
Spousal Support
Witness: credibility, expert

Dated: April 20, 2026
Affirming

Husband appealed on issues of business valuation and spousal support. The parties were married for about 28 years. Husband was a 75% owner of a business, Rod-Techs Inc., a commercial construction company. There was no dispute that Rod-Techs Inc. was a marital asset, and that the court was required to determine the value of the business.

Husband retained an expert witness. Husband’s expert prepared two reports valuing Husband’s ownership interest in Rod-Techs. The first report valued the interest at $480,000 as of December 31, 2021. The second report valued the interest at $210,000 as of December 31, 2022. Wife retained her own expert.

The trial was held in April 2024. Contested issues included the proper valuation date and the corresponding value of Husband’s ownership interest in Rod-Techs. Both experts testified, along with other witnesses.

Wife’s expert testified that he could not offer an opinion of the value of Rod-Techs due to the incomplete state of the records. However, he reviewed Husband’s expert’s report, which valued the interest at $480,000, and stated that he agreed with it.

Husband’s expert testified that the report valuing the company at $480,000 was “just a draft,” and that he was directed by Husband to draft a new report valuing the company as of a different date. This report valued the company at $210,000.

The trial court found Wife’s expert’s testimony that Rod-Tech records were “incomplete and inconsistent” to be credible. The court concluded that there was no evidence to suggest that Husband’s expert’s first report, which valued the company at $480,000, was “deficient in any way, or not complete.”

The trial court also observed that Husband’s expert’s second report contained significant discrepancies regarding payroll expenses and the claimed value of various business assets. These discrepancies, along with the fact that Rod-Techs had never been audited by an outside accounting firm, led the court to find that Husband’s expert’s second report, valuing the company at $210,000, lacked a sufficient basis. Finally, the trial court also noted that there was credible evidence which raised questions about whether Rod-Techs was being properly managed in a businesslike manner, and that Husband had used company coffers to pay for household and personal expenses including travel, dining, and entertainment.

The trial court found that without an arm's length sale of the business, the best evidence provided by the parties was that Rod-Techs was worth $480,000 at the end of the marriage.

Husband appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in determining the value of Rod-Techs. Husband asserted that (1) the evidence the court relied on to value Rod-Techs at $480,000 was improperly admitted under Evid.R. 702; and (2) the court’s valuation was not supported by competent, credible evidence.

The Court disagreed with Husband regarding Evid.R. 702, stating that domestic relations courts, like all courts, have broad discretion in deciding to admit expert testimony. Evid.R. 702 states that for expert testimony to be admissible, it must meet three requirements:

(A) The witness’s testimony either relates to matters beyond the knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a misconception common among lay persons;

(B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the subject matter of the testimony; and

(C) The witness’s testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized information…..

Husband argued that Wife’s expert lacked the specialized knowledge required by Evid.R. 702 because his main profession was accounting. The Court stated that under Ohio law, to qualify as an expert the witness does not have to be the most knowledgeable or the best witness on the topic at hand. Levine v. Kellogg, 2020-Ohio-1246. The relevant inquiry instead is whether the proposed witness possesses knowledge such that his or her testimony will aid the trier of fact on matters beyond the knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons. McCubbin v. Michigan Ladder Co., 112 Ohio App.3d 639, 642.

The Court reviewed Wife’s expert’s degree in accounting, along with his experience working as a revenue agent with the IRS, where he audited small and medium-sized businesses. Wife’s expert’s work also involved, among other things, business valuations of minority-owned businesses similar to Rod-Techs, and the general construction industry in and around the Cincinnati area, where Rod-Techs operates.

The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining Wife’s expert to be a “construction accounting” expert, which qualified him to render an opinion of the value of Husband’s ownership interest in Rod-Techs.

The Court also upheld the trial court’s determination that the first report prepared by Husband’s expert which valued the business at $480,000 could be relied upon by the trial court to determine the value of the business.

The Court held that the trial court’s determination of the value of Rod-Techs was supported by competent, credible evidence. This standard of review is highly deferential, and even “some” evidence is sufficient to sustain the judgment. Barkley v. Barkley, 119 Ohio App.3d 155, 159 (4th Dist. 1997).

On a separate issue, the Court also affirmed the trial court’s decision to award spousal support, stating that the trial court properly applied the statutory factors.

James v. James, 4th Dist. Adams No. 25CA1232, 2026-Ohio-1698

Marital Property: equitable division, valuation
Spousal Support

Dated: May 5, 2026
Reversing and Remanding

Wife appealed, presenting three assignments of error (1) the trial court abused its discretion in its distribution of marital assets and debt; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in its spousal support order; and (3) the trial court erred by issuing three different decisions which all conflict with one another.

Husband filed his complaint for divorce on the parties’ 24th wedding anniversary. The parties had no children together, and they owned various financial accounts and motor vehicles. The parties also owned real property in various states and some household goods and furnishings.

On July 15, 2024, the trial court issued an entry granting a divorce on the grounds of incompatibility. The trial court assigned values to various assets, and each party was awarded certain assets. Wife was awarded spousal support valued at $32,500 which she received during the pendency of the case, and a $200,000 lump sum support payment due before the end of the year. The trial court stated that it was awarding a lump sum instead of periodic support because Husband planned to retire in two years and he had no pension or retirement accounts.

Husband filed a motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law. On October 3, 2024, the trial court issued a second judgment entry which was materially different from the judgment entry issued on July 15, 2024. For example, the first entry did not assign a value to a mobile home, and the second entry stated the mobile home was valued at $60,000, but it later stated that there was no value assessed to it. Entry two also stated that both parties gave no value regarding certain personal property items.

There were also differences between the two judgment entries regarding spousal support. The second entry changed the terms to one half of the take-home income of the husband until his retirement.

Wife filed timely notices of appeal to both judgment entries. The Court of Appeals dismissed the first appeal, noting that the trial court did not dispose of all the parties’ property. The trial court was encouraged to resolve the inconsistencies between the two entries.

On October 30, 2025, the trial court issued an “Entry of Correction.” This third judgment entry assigned values to marital property, divided the property between the parties, and stated that Husband had already paid Wife $200,000 to catch up a temporary order of support, and that the remainder of the $200,000 should be viewed as a distributive award to further equalize the split of assets.

The Court reversed and remanded. It stated that it is unclear from the record what portion of the $200,000 was to be apportioned as spousal support, and how much was for the distributive award. There were other problems with the third entry as well. It stated that “the issues of spousal support were covered in the previous entry,” but it did not specify which entry.

The Court set forth the legal principles to be applied in O.R.C. 3105.171, including the provisions for distributive awards. Distributive awards are awards made from a party’s separate assets in order to achieve equity between the spouses. O.R.C. 3105.171(E).

Wife argued on appeal that the trial court was required to make an equal distribution of marital assets, but this argument was rejected. O.R.C. 3105.171(C) clearly provides that where an equal division would be inequitable, the trial court may not divide the property equally but instead must divide it in the manner that the court determines to be equitable. Neville v. Neville, 2003-Ohio-3624.

The Court also found that the trial court listed and applied the various factors contained in O.R.C. 3105.171(F) for the division of marital property. However, the trial court was reversed and remanded because the Court of Appeals was unable to conduct a meaningful review of the property division. The trial court did not explicitly state whether certain property was marital property or separate property and did not explicitly address the value of some assets.

The Court recognized that the parties failed to present evidence as to the value of certain assets. This did not relieve the duty of the trial court to make the valuation of property in sufficient detail to allow for meaningful appellate review. The trial court made no findings regarding the value of the home furnishings, tools, guns, and a 2017 Polaris 580 motor vehicle. It was therefore unclear whether the trial considered their value in determining the division of the assets. There was also a $100,000 typographical error regarding the value of California real estate owned by the parties.

For all of these reasons, the Court determined that it was unable to conduct a meaningful review of the property division, and that the trial court abused its discretion in its distribution of marital assets and debt. The property division was reversed and the case remanded.

The spousal support order was also reversed and remanded. This was primarily because the Court could not determine “what the award is.” Further, a trial court must divide marital property prior to making a spousal support award. Because the case was reversed and remanded on property issues, the case must also be remanded regarding spousal support.

Mahoney v. Moskowitz, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. DR-2300998, C-250228, 2026-Ohio-1638

Marital Property: appreciation, de facto date (termination of marriage), disclosure, investment account, omitted assets, prenuptial agreement, separate property, stock, tax liability, tracing
Spousal Support
Witness: expert

Dated: May 6, 2026
Affirming

The parties married in 2008. Prior to the marriage, Husband held ownership interests in two family businesses. On the day of the parties’ wedding, Husband presented Wife with an antenuptial agreement, which provided that property owned or acquired prior to marriage, along with any appreciation thereon, would remain separate property. The agreement likewise provided that liabilities attributable to separate property would be paid from that party’s separate property, and specifically referenced Husband’s business ownership interests.

The parties separated and initiated divorce proceedings in 2023. Wife challenged the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement, alleging that Husband first presented it while they were driving to their wedding and that she signed it under coercion. Husband testified that the parties discussed the agreement in advance of the wedding, noting the inclusion of Wife’s asset and debt information alongside his own, obtained as part of those discussions. Both parties acknowledged that their wedding ceremony had been exceptionally simple, with no guests or formal reception.

In April 2024, the trial court determined that the prenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable. Among other considerations, the trial court noted both parties’ history of prior marriages, and found that—had Wife wished—she could have easily postponed the parties’ simple ceremony with no significant hardship. Prior to signing, the parties had crossed out and initialed changes to the agreement, further undermining Wife’s claim of duress.

Trial was held in November and December of 2024. During the trial, Husband presented testimony from his family businesses’ accountant, concerning Husband’s increased ownership interests in the family businesses during the marriage. The increase was a result of the retirement of other shareholders, not the purchase of any additional shares by Husband. Husband also presented expert testimony tracing funds through several UBS accounts, and the relative marital/non-marital funds therein.

In March 2025, the trial court issued a decision, finding that Husband’s interests in both family businesses, proceeds attributable thereto, and 30 silver bars received from a customer (Wife had removed 15 of them prior to separating), were his separate property. The trial court likewise found Husband’s expert’s testimony credible and adopted the trace findings for its order, assigning almost the entirety of Husband’s UBS accounts to him as his separate property. The trial court utilized 06/13/2023 (when Wife moved out of the marital residence) as the marital end date for property division, and applied an earlier date for the division of certain stock shares it found Wife induced Husband into transferring. Husband was ordered to pay spousal support payments of $3,000/month for approximately three years.

Wife appealed, raising five assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in finding the parties’ antenuptial agreement valid and enforceable;

2. The trial court erred in finding that the UBS accounts were primarily Husband’s separate property;

3. The trial court erred in finding that the silver bars were Husband’s separate property;

4. The trial court erred in denying Wife an equalization payment for taxes attributable to Husband’s separate business interests; and

5. The trial court erred in terminating Wife’s spousal support in 2028 rather than awarding support indefinitely.

In her first assignment, Wife again cited Husband’s presentation of the agreement on the day of their wedding as evidence of coercion. She further alleged that Husband failed to fully disclose his assets and liabilities: while the agreement provided values for Husband’s ownership interests, no specific shares amounts were given. Nor did the agreement identify an obligation owed to Husband’s ex-wife, from proceeds of the sale of one of the businesses. The court disagreed. Competent evidence supported the trial court’s findings concerning the circumstances under which Wife signed the agreement, including her ability to postpone the wedding, and the parties’ actual modifications to its terms.

The Court similarly rejected Wife’s disclosure argument. Because the prenuptial agreement provided Wife with disproportionately less than an equitable distribution, to claim its validity, Husband bore the burden of demonstrating that a full disclosure was made. But full disclosure did not require an exact accounting of Husband’s wealth. Husband identified his business interests in the agreement, and provided monetary values in an exhibit. The Court found no authority requiring disclosure of his exact number of shares or ownership percentages. Nor was the Court persuaded that Husband concealed a liability to his ex-wife, so as to provide sufficient grounds to invalidate the prenuptial agreement.

Moreover, the failure to include an encumbrance to an asset, which leads to its overvaluation, is “not a concealment of assets” and will not invalidate a prenuptial agreement. Azarova at ¶ 19-20. Thus, we see no reason to depart from the trial court’s determination as to Husband’s liability to Ex-Wife.

In her second and third assignments, Wife argued that Husband’s ownership interest in the family businesses had substantially increased during the marriage when other family member owners retired. At the time of their marriage, Husband owned approximately 15.5% of the businesses. During the marriage, Husband would gain 100% ownership, which growth Wife argued constituted marital property. The Court again disagreed. Testimony established that Husband acquired no additional shares during the marriage; instead, the companies repurchased other owners’ shares thereby increasing the percentage of Husband’s ownership. Although Husband’s percentage ownership and the value of his existing shares increased, the parties’ prenuptial agreement expressly provided that appreciation on separate property remained separate.

Wife presented no expert at trial, nor did she present an alternate accounting to rebut Husband’s trace analysis. The bulk of her argument concerned the treatment of Husband’s increased ownership percentage, and its assignment to him as separate property. The UBS accounts had been funded almost entirely by proceeds attributable to Husband’s businesses, which separate character the Court affirmed.

The Court likewise affirmed the characterization of a defined benefit retirement account maintained in Husband’s post-sale business name as separate property. Wife argued the account was funded with income earned during the marriage, but Husband’s expert traced the funds to his business sale and related proceeds.

During trial court proceedings, Husband testified that his business had received the silver bars as payment from a customer, which were later moved to the parties’ residence. Based on this testimony and the trial court’s credibility findings, the Court affirmed their classification as Husband’s separate property.

Wife also challenged the trial court’s use of an alternative marital end/valuation date for 350 shares of META stock. Husband transferred the shares from his separate account into a joint account in April 2023, after Wife expressed concerns about her financial situation if Husband died. The trial court otherwise used 06/13/2023—the date Wife moved out—as the valuation date for marital property division. Finding that Wife induced Husband to make the transfer in an effort to convert the shares to marital property, the trial court used April 12 as the applicable date for those shares. The Court affirmed, noting a trial court may employ alternative valuation dates to achieve an equitable division of marital assets.

Wife further sought an equalization payment based on approximately $670,000 in taxes attributable to dividends and sale proceeds from Husband’s businesses. She alleged that these payments made during the course of the marriage were from marital funds, contrary to the prenuptial agreement’s terms, under which liabilities attributable to Husband’s separate businesses were required to be paid from Husband’s separate property. The Court found, however, that the evidence demonstrated that the tax liabilities had in fact been paid from distributions attributable to Husband’s businesses. Husband earned only approximately $51,000/year in marital wages, while the business-related taxes averaged approximately $134,000/year. The liabilities could only have been paid from distributions attributable to Husband’s separately owned businesses. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Wife’s request for a distributive award.

Finally, the Court affirmed the trial court’s award of $3,000/month in spousal support to Wife for approximately three years. In declining to award indefinite support payments, the trial court considered the statutory factors, including Husband’s retirement, the parties’ respective assets and Social Security benefits, Wife’s prior career and potential employability, and the nearly $100,000 equalization payment she’d already received.

Nestleroad v. Nestleroad, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT 2025-0047, 2026-Ohio-1712

Marital Property: valuation; separate property; distributive award

Dated: May 11, 2026
Affirming

Husband and Wife were married on June 19, 2008. They separated on April 1, 2022, when Husband voluntarily left the marital home. Both parties filed for divorce, and the trial was held on December 12, 2023.

The parties stipulated that the marital residence had a fair market value of $205,000, and that Husband, using premarital funds, made a downpayment of $17,000 to purchase the home prior to the marriage.

The trial court made what it considered to be an equitable, though not equal, division of assets. This is permissible in accordance with O.R.C. 3105.171(B) and Neville v. Neville, 2003-Ohio-3624. Factors the trial court should consider when making a division of marital property include the duration of the marriage, the assets and liabilities of the parties, the desirability of awarding the family home to the spouse with custody of the child, the liquidity of the property to be distributed, the economic desirability of retaining an asset intact, the tax consequences of the property division, any retirement benefits of the parties, and any other factor the court expressly finds to be relevant and equitable. O.R.C. 3105.171(F).

The trial court deducted Husband’s $17,000 separate interest before determining the marital equity. Husband argued that the value of the home should have been divided in half before subtracting his separate interest from Wife’s share.

The Court found no merit in Husband’s appeal, stating that the mathematical approach utilized by the trial court was consistent with the method approved by the Eleventh District Court of Appeals in Kondik v. Kondik, 2009-Ohio-2300 (11th Dist.). The Court found no abuse of discretion by the lower court regarding the property division.

In his second assignment of error, Husband contended that the trial court erred in calculating the distributive award on the marital balance sheet. The trial court found that Husband failed to pay temporary support in the amount of $22,503.96, and that he engaged in financial misconduct by withdrawing $10,532.46 from the parties’ joint account. Based on these findings, the trial court made what it characterized as a distributive award pursuant to O.R.C. 3105.171(E)(3).

On the marital balance sheet, the trial court credited Husband $46,681.07, debited Wife the same amount, and labeled this as a “distributive award.” This was not a true distributive award because the award was not made from separate property. It simply was the amount needed for Wife to “pay” Husband an equalization payment.

Despite the incorrect use of the term “distributive award,” the Court found that there was no abuse of discretion in doing so.

Finally, Husband argued that cumulative errors on the balance sheet used by the trial court to divide marital assets materially affected the total award and constituted an abuse of discretion. This argument was rejected by the Court of Appeals.

The cumulative error doctrine provides that “a trial court’s judgment may be reversed if the cumulative effect of multiple errors prevents a fair trial, even though each of the individual errors, standing alone, would not constitute grounds for reversal.” Marrs v. Mickel, 2023-Ohio-4528. The Court concluded that there was no cumulative effect which resulted in Husband being denied a fair trial.

Prausa v. Prausa, 2nd Dist. Greene No. 2025-CA-58, 2026-Ohio-1894

Marital Property: retirement benefits (military)

Dated: May 5, 2026
Affirming

Husband appealed from a judgment that denied his motion to eliminate a military pension division order. Husband’s pension was in payout status at the time of the divorce. The decree stated that the parties agreed that Wife was entitled to 43% of Husband’s pension, and that Husband was entitled to 50% of Wife’s pension earned during the marriage. It was ordered that “the pensions shall be divided using September 24, 1994, as the beginning date of marriage and June 13, 2022, as the ending date of marriage.” The trial court also stated, “The effective date of division shall be June 13, 2022.” It was ordered that a “QDRO or DOPO shall be issued reflecting the agreement of parties concerning the retirement accounts.”

In November 2023, Wife prepared a Proposed Military Retired Pay Division Order (MRPDO) and submitted it to the trial court. Robert filed an objection to the proposed order because it allowed for cost of living adjustments (COLA) to Wife, and the final decree did not specifically award Wife any COLA increases. Wife argued in response that relevant Federal law provided for COLA increases because the decree awarded a percentage, rather than a dollar amount, of each party’s pension to the other. The magistrate filed a decision finding that the parties intended for the COLA increases to be included. Husband filed a timely objection, which he later withdrew. The trial court affirmed the magistrate’s decision, and no appeal was taken from this judgment.

Thereafter, Wife submitted another proposed MRPDO to Husband. Husband refused to sign it, and Wife submitted it to the trial court. The order was signed by the trial court and filed on October 28, 2024. Husband filed a motion to set aside the MRPDO, claiming it impermissibly modified the decree of divorce.

Husband argued that the MRPDO required him to pay Wife her share of his pension benefits beginning on June 13, 2022, and that Wife was not entitled to any portion of his pension until July 1, 2023, which was the first full month after the filing of the decree. In support, Husband contended that the June 13, 2022, date of division set forth in the decree related solely to how Wife’s pension would be divided, and that the date did not apply to the timing of payments for his benefits.

Following a hearing, the magistrate determined that the decree provided that both pensions were to be divided as of June 13, 2022, and that Wife was thus entitled to payments beginning on that date. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision.

Husband appealed, even though he failed to file objections to the magistrate’s decision. The Court ruled that because Husband did not file objections, he waived all but plain error in the adoption of the decision. Husband’s argument on appeal was that the trial court failed to give him proper credit for a portion of his military pension payments that he claimed were deposited into bank accounts that were subsequently divided between the parties. The trial court found these issues to be barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and the Court of Appeals agreed.

The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is a complete bar to any subsequent actions on the same claims between the same parties or those in privity. Brooks v. Kelly, 2015-Ohio-2805. Where a claim could have been litigated in the previous suit, claim preclusion also bars subsequent actions on that matter. Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 381 (1995).

Husband claimed that he made certain mortgage payments during the pendency of the divorce, and that he should receive credit for those payments against the retroactive arrearage on Wife’s share of his pension benefits. However, the divorce decree, which was based on the parties’ agreement, did not mention any prior mortgage payments made by Husband or any claim that he had the right to repayment thereof. The Court held that it could be reasonably inferred that Husband voluntarily relinquished any claim for repayment of the mortgage payments, and that the trial court correctly determined that Husband’s claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

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