Ohio Case Law Review by Topic: July 1, 2025 through August 31, 2025

Stueve v. Stueve, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 2023DR00167, CA 30331, 2025-Ohio-2359

Marital Property: ambiguity, retirement benefits, separate property, tracing
QDRO: equalization, impermissible modification, merely implements decree
ORC 3105.171(I): (prohibition on modification)

Dated: July 3, 2025
Affirming

The parties began divorce proceedings in March 2023, and after a series of motions related to contact, custody, and support, a final hearing was held in July 2024. At the hearing, the parties explained to the trial court that they had reached agreement on their marital property division, including their respective retirement accounts, which they both agreed was fair and equitable.

The following September, the trial court entered its final judgment and decree, incorporating the parties’ stipulations for retirement account division. It read: “All retirement is marital in nature. The marital portion shall be defined as the time from April 20, 2002 (Date of Marriage) through January 1, 2023 (Date of Division).” The parties agreed to an offset of their respective accounts, based on the marital portions, to be effectuated via QDRO from the largest account, owned by Husband.

When no QDRO was entered in the allotted 30 days, the trial court issued an order to show cause. In November 2024, Wife filed a motion opposing a QDRO allegedly prepared by Husband but not entered with the trial court, and attached her own order for entry. This QDRO was adopted by the trial court, and awarded Wife $235,818 as of 01/01/2023. Husband filed a motion to modify the order, arguing that it failed to exclude his pre-marital interest, but he provided no evidence for, nor amount of said interest. Husband appealed before the trial court ruled on his motion.

In his appeal, Husband argued that the trial court abused its discretion by entering Wife’s QDRO “without addressing the inconsistent and ambiguous retirement division terms” within the decree. Wife countered that his appeal was premature, as the trial court had not yet ruled on Husband’s motion to modify the QDRO. The Court disagreed, finding that Husband’s appeal was of the QDRO itself.

Marital property is subject to equal division as a starting point, except when a trial court finds that this would create an inequitable result. Whereas property acquired before the marriage retains its separate property status, provided the claimant of said property meets the burden of proof to trace their ownership. QDROs, the Court continued, implement and must be consistent with the trial court’s decree, and are voidable to error under ORC 3105.171(I) should they fail to do so. The question of whether a QDRO conflicts with, and impermissibly modifies a decree is thus a question of law, and subject to the Court’s de novo review.

In his appeal, Husband alleged that the decree’s language was ambiguous: it deemed all retirement marital in nature, but specified the marital portion as amounts accrued from the date of marriage through 01/01/2023. Wife countered Husband’s appeal was thus of the decree itself, and untimely. She further noted Husband’s failure to assert his separate property claim during the proceedings, and argued that the trial court’s definition of the marital portion does not in itself nullify the determination that “[a]ll retirement is marital in nature.”

What’s round on the ends and pie in the middle?

Noting Husband’s failure to cite any evidence in the record of his alleged pre-marital interest, the Court affirmed. With no evidence of a separate property claim in the record, the Court found no inconsistency or modification between the QDRO and the decree, and overruled Husband’s sole assignment of error.

The Court further found that Husband’s appeal failed to identify evidence to support his claim of ambiguity, writing:

[E]ven if we were to address the issue of whether the property division in the divorce decree was ambiguous, we would be unable to determine, based on the record before us, whether the property division language in the divorce decree was ambiguous or simply redundant or complementary. For example, if all of the monies contributed to the two retirement accounts listed in the divorce decree were contributed during the parties’ marriage, then the following two sentences would be, at worst, redundant or complementary rather than ambiguous or conflicting: “All retirement is marital in nature. The martial [sic] portion shall be defined as the time from April 20, 2002 (Date of Marriage) through January 1, 2023 (Date of Division).” Decree, p. 9.

Coxon v. Coxon, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2021 DR 00445, 2024-A-0064, 2025-Ohio-2395

Marital Property: equalization, equitable division, de facto date (termination of marriage), disclosure, distributive award, omitted assets, retirement benefits, separate property, stock, tax (consequences), valuation
Spousal Support

Dated: July 7, 2025
Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part, and Remanding

During the parties’ marriage, Husband became partner at a successful and eventually dissolved law firm, before becoming general counsel for a manufacturing company. Wife filed for divorce twice: once in July 2020 and again in December 2021, immediately after her first case was dismissed.

Prior to the divorce, Husband moved out of the parties’ home in January 2019. Around the same time, Wife opened up two checking accounts in her name only. Wife obtained full time employment of her own in November 2020, and in December 2020 moved out of the residence. The parties attended one marriage counseling session, attended some events and took some trips together with their children, and never had conjugal relations.

During the pendency of the trial, the dissolution of Husband’s law firm concluded, and he received compensation for his ownership share. He failed to disclose the distributions, and began depositing salary from his new employment into the same, undisclosed account. The account grew to more than $880,000 at its peak. Discovery by Wife’s counsel also uncovered shares of stock that had not been declared in Husband’s financial affidavit. Husband was ordered to pay $4,000/month in temporary spousal support, and $500/month in temporary child support, based on income from his disclosed earnings.

At proceedings, the parties testified as to assets including real estate, Husband’s business holdings and interests, and retirement and other accounts. The trial court adopted a de facto marriage end date of 07/09/2020, coinciding closely with Wife’s first divorce filing. The trial court divided the parties’ marital property as of the de facto termination of marriage date, but found Husband’s actions constituted financial misconduct, entitling Wife to a share of post-marital assets. Among other findings, the trial court’s decree:

• Assigned spousal support to Wife of $4,000/month, for 72 months;

• Awarded Wife half of Husband’s undisclosed law firm income from 2019 and 2020, totaling 108,796;

• Provided a non-marital property distributive award of $350,000 to Wife, in consideration of her contribution to his career;

• Awarded payment of $130,250 for Wife’s 50% equity in the marital residence, retained by Husband;

• Further assigned $134,280 to Wife, representing half of the value of Husband’s undisclosed account as of July 2020, reduced by the undisclosed income already awarded to her;

• Provided 735 shares of stock to Husband, including 600 shares determined to be separate property;

• Assigned both parties half of the marital portions of their respective retirement accounts; and

• Ordered $103,925 paid to Wife for her share of the parties’ personal property, and $32,500 for a boat retained by Husband.

Both parties appealed, with Husband arguing four assignments of error:

1. The trial court’s award of $108,796 was an improper distributive award;

2. The trial court’s award of $350,000 from non-marital funds was unsupported and inequitable;

3. The trial court utilized the March 2023 balance for a home equity loan in determining Wife’s interest in the residence, while otherwise applying a July 2020 valuation date; and

4. The trial court erred in its $115,190 of his business interest.

In addressing Husband’s first assignment of error, the Court disagreed that the $108,796 constituted a distributive award to Wife. Though the trial court noted Husband’s misconduct in its findings, there is nothing in the record to suggest that this award was from his separate property. Rather, the trial court found that Husband’s undisclosed income was marital property based on the de facto termination of marriage date, and thus—the Court wrote—its assignment thereof to Wife could not be a distributive award as defined under ORC 3105.171(A)(1).

To address Husband’s second assignment of error, the Court reviewed the trial court’s reasonings for the $350,000 distributive award, which included Wife’s years of family service in support of his career, and Husband’s failure to disclose income. The Court cited factors for consideration in determining a distributive award (under ORC 3105.171(F)), including in this case the term of marriage and the parties’ respective earnings capacities. Husband’s failure to disclose his income was undisputed, and under the factors outlined above, the distributive award to Wife was well within the trial court’s discretion.

Turning to Husband’s third assignment of error, the Court agreed. Despite using a 07/09/2020 de facto end of marriage date in its division of marital property, the trial court improperly applied the March 2023 home equity loan balance in determining Wife’s interest in the residence. If, as the Court opined might be the case, the trial court in its own discretion deemed that use of a later loan balance would result in a more equitable division of marital property, it nonetheless failed to explain or support its rationale.

The Court rejected Husband’s fourth assignment of error, finding that despite his assertions otherwise, the trial court had utilized the de facto marriage termination date in valuing his business interest (applied to its sale proceeds in 2023), as well as his tax liabilities therefrom.

In her cross appeal, Wife asserted three assignments of error, arguing:

1. The trial court’s 07/09/2020 de facto marriage termination date was too early;

2. The trial court failed to divide Husband’s business interests and stock equally; and

3. Spousal support payments to her should’ve remained indefinite.

Trial courts determine marital terms and ending dates under the guidelines in ORC 3105.171(A)(2), and their findings are subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard. Additional factors for consideration were established in Dill v. Dill, 2008-Ohio-5310, including as relevant to this matter: whether both parties believed the marriage ended prior to the hearing; whether the parties lived as husband and wife during the separation; whether the parties cohabitated; whether the parties utilized separate bank accounts; and whether the parties attempted to reconcile.

Based on the Dill factors above, the trial court’s utilization of a date immediately following Wife’s first filing for divorce was well within its discretion. The parties had ceased living together, maintained separate bank accounts, and while this first case was dismissed, Wife filed again for divorce the day afterward. The Court thus affirmed.

In Wife’s second assignment of error, she argued the trial court erred when it declined to assign half of Husband’s business ownership interests to her, instead awarding her half of the marital earnings therefrom as of the de facto marriage termination date. The Court disagreed—Husband’s business holdings were complex and structured in a way that their division presented hurdles that the trial court, exercising its discretion, chose to avoid by payment to Wife for her interest.

The Court likewise affirmed the trial court’s award of 600 stock shares to Husband, which the trial court noted he’d purchased after the de facto date with the residual funds of a bank account Wife had already received her assigned interest from.

Finally, the Court found that the trial court properly considered the factors under ORC 3105.18(C)(1) when it declined to award Wife support payments indefinitely, and committed no abuse of discretion.

K.L.B. v. M.T.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. DR-19-377095, 114029, 2025-Ohio-2445

Attorney Fees
Civ. R. 53
Marital Property: equalization, retirement benefits, separate property, totality of circumstances, tracing, valuation
Spousal Support
Witness: expert

Dated: July 10, 2025
Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part, and Remanding

The parties separated and began divorce proceedings in 2019. Husband was a doctor in urology, with ownership interests in several urology practices, while Wife maintained the family home. A magistrate’s hearing followed, both parties filed objections, and the trial court adopted the magistrate’s findings including those below:

[Husband] had six business interests valued at $1,448,850: Southwest Urology LLC ($75,000), 6900 Surgery Center LLC ($370,000), Pearl Road Surgery Center LLC ($405,000), Emerald Necklace Urology Group LLC ($270,000), “If Defendant is a ‘Designated Physician’” ($38,850), and the Smith Road Properties sale proceeds ($290,000). [Wife] was awarded a lump sum of $724,425, to be paid in monthly installments of $3,000 while the spousal-support award is active, rising to $7,000 a month thereafter.

Both parties filed timely appeals, with Husband asserting that the trial court erred: (1) in its valuations of his business interests; (2) in failing to make an equitable division of marital property; and (3) in refusing to allow new testimony and the submission of new evidence after objections to the magistrate’s decision were filed.

In considering Husband’s appeal, the Court noted that—while an abuse of discretion standard is applicable to most trial court determinations—a Court will apply a manifest weight of the evidence standard when reviewing a trial court’s valuation of an asset. This standard allows for greater scrutiny of the trial court’s evidentiary and witness credibility findings than is permitted in review for abuse of discretion.

Husband alleged that the trial court inadvertently double counted the $290,000 proceeds from the sale of Smith Road Properties, because those funds had already been deposited into a retirement account that was divided equally between the parties. Wife did not refute this, but argued Husband’s failure to raise the issue in his objections to the magistrate’s decision waived his right to do so in his later objections to the decree, and now on appeal. The Court disagreed, finding that the trial court’s double counting created an inequitable result.

Continuing with his first assignment of error, Husband asserted that the trial court erred in determining he had a $75,000 interest in Southwest Urology, when the business was owned entirely by another physician who testified to the same. Wife referred to the testimony of her expert witness as corroboration of this amount, but cited no specific portion thereof. Upon review of the testimony, the Court found no evidence therein to establish Husband’s purported ownership of Southwest Urology. Thus, the Court found, the trial court erred in its double counting of $290,000 sale proceeds, and its assignment of a $75,000 interest in Southwest Urology.

Husband contended that the trial court likewise erred when it failed to award to him as his separate property: (a) $370,000 interest in 6900 Surgery Center, which he alleged was received from a previous divorce; and (b) $138,613 representing his pre-marital interest—with gains/losses thereon—in a retirement account. Here, the Court disagreed. Noting the presumption that marital period income or growth derived from separate property is marital, unless sufficient evidence demonstrates otherwise, the Court found that Husband failed to trace his alleged non-marital interest in these assets. At trial, Husband offered the testimony of his financial advisor, but provided no supporting account statements or documentation to meet the burden of proof to establish his claim.

Still in his first assignment, Husband alleged the trial court erred when it refused to consider new evidence of the fair market value of his interest in Emerald Necklace Urology. In assigning a $270,000 value to this asset, the trial court relied on the trial testimony of Wife’s expert. Subsequent to trial, but prior to final judgment, however, Husband sold his interest for $205,000. The trial court denied Husband’s request to consider this new evidence of the fair market value of this asset, finding in favor of Wife’s arguments and deeming his request a motion for a new trial, under Civ. R. 59. Citing Schwenk v. Schwenk, 2 Ohio App.3d 250 (8th Dist.1982), the trial court found that Husband’s request sought to introduce evidence that was not discoverable before or during trial. The Court disagreed, finding that Schwenk was not analogous, because Husband’s motion in this matter was made prior to the decree. Thus, consideration of Husband’s request properly fell under Civ. R. 53(D)(4)(d), which permits a trial court to admit additional evidence, when such evidence was not available prior to the magistrate’s hearing, despite reasonable diligence. The evidence Husband sought to present was certainly not available prior to the hearing, and thus—the Court found—the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled his motion to consider additional evidence.

On Wife’s cross-appeal, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the one-year spousal support award, the decision not to secure support or property division with life insurance or accruing interest, or the denial of attorney fees. The Court emphasized that each issue fell within the trial court’s discretionary authority and that Wife’s arguments merely reasserted those she already made without demonstrating error.

Shteiwi v. Abdelmassih, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. DR-2201712, C-240429, 2025-Ohio-2901

Marital Property: appreciation, equitable division, life insurance, separate property, tracing
ORC 3105.05(A): postnuptial agreements
Witness: expert

Dated: August 15, 2025
Affirming

Prior to the parties’ marriage, Husband co-owned several out-of-state rental properties. The parties married in 2016, Husband sold his properties, and then used the proceeds to purchase a multi-unit property with his business partner. They relocated to California in 2017, where Husband and his co-investor made major improvements to the property before selling it in 2018, netting Husband $227,000 profits. During their time in California, Wife signed an interspousal deed, waiving her interest in the multi-unit property. The parties moved back to Ohio, where Husband used his proceeds to purchase new rental properties, and they eventually acquired a marital residence in 2019.

The parties separated and began divorce proceedings in 2022. At trial, Husband’s expert offered testimony and a forensic accounting, opining a $343,792 separate property interest held by Husband, based on a tracing of Husband’s property purchases and sales. The expert’s findings relied on the 2017 interspousal deed and waiver of Wife’s interest in the multi-unit property, assumed that the mortgage for the property was not paid with marital funds, and further that Wife’s efforts had made no contribution to the property’s increase in value.

In its decision, the trial court found that Husband failed to establish his alleged separate ownership of the multi-unit property, and Wife’s purported non-interest therein. His expert’s report relied on faulty assumptions, and the 2017 interspousal deed was void because Ohio law at the time permitted no such agreements. Without establishing his sole interest in the multi-unit property, his tracing of its sale proceeds through subsequently purchased properties falls apart. Thus, the trial court deemed all non-stipulated real estate acquired after the multi-unit property as fully marital. The trial court assigned child support payments of $2,014/month, deviating upward in consideration of expenses borne by Wife for private school tuition and childcare. And Husband was ordered to maintain a $500,000 life insurance policy until the parties’ child reached the age of majority, with Wife as beneficiary.

Husband appealed, raising the following assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred by classifying proceeds from the multi-unit property as marital rather than separate property.

2. The trial court erred by finding Husband failed to trace proceeds from the multi-unit property’s sale into subsequent property acquisitions.

3. The trial court erred by upwardly deviating from the child support guidelines and miscalculating his income.

4. The trial court erred by requiring Husband to maintain a $500,000 life insurance policy for party’s minor child’s benefit.

5. The trial court erred by ordering Husband to return certain items of Wife’s personal property.

6. The trial court erred by dividing the parties’ cryptocurrency by number of coins rather than by value.

In its review, the Court examines a trial court’s equitable division of marital property for abuse of discretion. Where questions arise concerning designation of property as marital/non-marital, the Court applies a manifest weight of the evidence standard, or a sufficiency standard. Courts may consider the ‘active’ versus ‘passive’ means by which property increased in value, with the ultimate determination turning on whether the claimed separate property can be reliably traced through subsequent transactions.

Addressing Husband’s first argument, the Court conceded that the multi-unit property had been purchased in large part using Husband’s proceeds from the sale of his non-marital properties, obtained prior to the marriage. But Husband offered no evidence to counter Wife’s claims that marital funds had been utilized for the purchase as well. Husband also failed to refute Wife’s claim that the increased value stemmed from the active efforts of both parties. The Court further agreed with the trial court’s determination that the 2017 interspousal deed was void, because such arrangements were prohibited under existing Ohio law at the time, noting: “While R.C. 3103.06 was amended in 2023 to permit post-nuptial agreements, the amended version does not contain any language that contemplates retrospective application.”

In the trial court’s decision, Wife’s parental contributions were noted as evincing the partnership whereby the parties’ mutual efforts lead to the increased value of the multi-unit property. Noting that the minor child was born after the property’s sale, the Court agreed with Husband’s assertion that this was clearly in error, but disagreed that the misstatement wholly undermined the trial court’s findings. Thus, finding no abuse of discretion, the Court affirmed.

In his second assignment, Husband argued the trial court erred in finding his expert’s tracing insufficient for establishing proof of his separate property claim. But he failed to address the trial court’s finding that the report relied on faulty assumptions, and thus the Court could not find the trial court’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The Court likewise found Husband’s third assignment unpersuasive. A trial court may exercise discretion when awarding child support, and deviate from guideline amounts based on ORC 3119.23 factors. In this case, the trial court considered Wife’s elevated expenses for the schooling and care of the parties’ child, whom they had agreed would remain enrolled in private school. Thus, the trial court committed no abuse of discretion when it applied factors under ORC 3119.23(C), (I), and (P), and determined that upward deviation of child support would be necessary to adequately support Wife’s expenses raising the child.

Husband cited case law to support his fourth assignment of error—concerning his life insurance obligation—which he argued capped such policies for child support payors to the overall obligation amount that would otherwise have been paid until the child reached the age of majority. Finding no other application of this supposed rule, the Court disagreed, finding no abuse of discretion.

Husband’s fifth assignment of error was likewise overruled. Husband contended that the trial court erred when it deemed property he had removed to be Wife’s separate property. But the trial court had merely ordered its return and availability to the parties to divide.

In his last assignment, Husband argued that the trial court erred when it evenly divided the parties’ cryptocurrency by ‘coin’ amounts, rather than evenly dividing their respective coin ‘wallets.’ But he failed to support his argument, or establish why the outcome would be inequitable, and the Court again affirmed.

S.M. v. A.P., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. DR-18-374386, 113909, 2025-Ohio-2985

Attorney Fees
Marital Property: equalization, equitable division, disability, financial misconduct, omitted assets, separate property, social security, totality of circumstances, tracing, trust
Spousal Support: definition of income

Dated: August 21, 2025
Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part, and Remanding

Immediately before the parties’ marriage in 2003, they financed the purchase of a house with a mortgage in both of their names, and a downpayment of $48,158 paid by Wife. Husband was diagnosed with cancer in 2010, and began receiving insurance and Social Security disability payments. Wife had inheritance assets, including funds deposited into a jointly titled brokerage account used by both parties during the marriage, as well as a larger trust account titled in Wife’s name only.

In 2017, Wife removed $108,000 from the brokerage account, and borrowed $40,000 from her daughter’s custodial trust to purchase and move into a separate home. She filed for divorce in December 2017, but dismissed in February 2018, before refiling in November 2018. Husband was ordered to pay temporary support, and trial was scheduled for May 2021. Trial was not completed, and its scheduled recommencement was further delayed when Husband’s counsel suffered a serious illness. Proceedings resumed in February 2023, but the resultant magistrate’s decision was vacated by the trial court, which entered a decree of divorce in April 2024.

In its decree, the trial court deemed both residences marital property and ordered them sold. Wife was awarded 26.9% of the proceeds from the marital home for her downpayment using non-marital funds. The brokerage account was ordered evenly divided, with the trial court finding Wife failed to trace her non-marital interest therein, and that myriad deposits, withdrawals, and mingling of marital funds had occurred during the marriage. Wife’s nonprofit, established during the marriage, was deemed marital and valued at $26,888, with Husband to receive half its value.

In 2020, Husband received two payments of retroactive Social Security disability benefits, a $66,696 payment for his benefit, and a $39,016 payment for the derivative benefit of the parties’ minor child. The trial court’s decree awarded the first payment to Husband as his separate property, and ordered the second payment split between the parties. Noting Wife’s significant, non-marital ($2.3M) trust account, the trial court determined that spousal support would be inappropriate, notwithstanding Husband’s greater annual income. Both parties appealed, alleging 14 total assignments and cross-assignments of error.

Noting its abuse of discretion standard of review in marital property determinations, and the claimant party’s burden of proof for separate property interests, the Court addressed Wife’s arguments related to the brokerage account and the residence she purchased in 2017. Wife alleged that the brokerage account had been funded prior to the marriage with $400,000 from an inheritance. But, the Court noted, this account was subject to a $150,000 margin loan at the time of the marriage. Wife would add Husband’s name to the account, and the parties made numerous marital deposits and withdrawals during the marriage. Wife offered no specific value for and altogether failed to trace her alleged separate interest, and the Court thus affirmed. Because Wife used funds from this account to purchase her separate residence, the Court likewise affirmed the trial court’s determination that the residence was marital property and subject to equal division.

In Husband’s appeal, he argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded Wife 26.9% of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence. He alleged that Wife failed to prove that the downpayment came from her separate property, and that she failed to offer evidence for its passive value growth. Husband never contested the source of funds prior to his appeal, and the record did not support his allegation. To calculate growth on Wife’s downpayment, the trial court applied the Sauer formula, deriving a ratio based on the separate and total investments, applied to the current value of the property. The Court found no abuse of discretion, and affirmed.

In Wife’s appeal, she argued that the trial court erred in its classification of her nonprofit as marital property, while Husband’s cross-assignment of error asserted that the trial court undervalued it. While marital property “includes real or personal property acquired by either spouse during the marriage that is owned by either or both at the time of divorce,” nonprofit corporations are independent legal entities in which neither party can maintain ownership interest. Such findings align with previous rulings by the Court in Macfarlane v. Macfarlane, 2006-Ohio-3155. The Court thus reversed, finding that the trial court erred when it included the nonprofit in the marital estate.

In two cross-assignments of error, Husband alleged that the trial court erred in its award of certain financial accounts to Wife as her separate property, and its equal division of the parties’ retirement accounts. The Court disagreed, finding that the separate property award to Wife of her financial accounts was supported by inheritance documentation and a lack of commingling. The Court likewise found that—because the parties’ retirement accounts were earned during the marriage—equal division thereof was appropriate, and Wife’s separate property resources did not require a different result.

Husband argued that the trial court erred when it failed to give consideration for the temporary spousal support he paid during the lengthy pendency of the parties’ divorce. The Court again affirmed, noting both parties’ obstructive conduct and contributions to the protracted proceedings. Further, Husband failed to make a timely motion for modification of the original support order.

Turning to Husband’s Social Security benefit payments, the Court first noted that while a trial court may consider Social Security benefits when dividing marital property, it is prohibited from treating the benefits themselves as marital property. Wife’s assignment of error, concerning the award of Husband’s first disability payment to him as his separate property, was thus overruled.

The court further upheld the imputation of income to Wife, and non-award of spousal support, as correctly determined under ORC 3105.18(C)(1)(i). Wife’s trust generated roughly $50,000 of income in earnings annually, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering this and finding spousal support inappropriate.

Both parties’ claims for attorney fees were overruled. The record shows that both Husband and Wife’s conduct contributed to the delayed proceedings and their respective legal fees. Husband alleged that Wife committed financial misconduct when she failed to disclose significant non-marital assets in a timely manner. But because these assets were wholly Wife’s separate, non-marital property, a distributive award or finding of financial misconduct would not have been appropriate.

In Part II of the Court’s opinion, Husband’s cross-assignment of error is addressed, concerning the equal division of the minor child derivative Social Security benefit. The Court affirmed the equal division of the derivative benefit, with one Justice filing a dissenting opinion.

The Court found that this payment was distinct from cases involving the division of a spouse’s own Social Security benefits, because it relates instead to retroactive derivative payments, and not future income replacement. Citing Williams v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 441 (2000), the Court noted a trial court’s discretion to credit Social Security payments made to a minor child toward an obligor’s child support obligation. In this case, Husband’s awarded share of the derivative benefit (paid for the parties’ minor child) actually exceeded Husband’s temporary child support obligation, creating a windfall for him. Thus, the Court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court, and affirmed.

In an attached dissenting opinion, a Justice countered that the derivative Social Security payment was not legally divisible under Federal law and Ohio precedent. At the conclusion of proceedings and the trial court’s issuance of a decree, Husband had no support arrearages that would permit the derivative benefit to operate as a credit under Williams, which the majority referenced in affirming the equal division. Nor does the benefit’s retroactive receipt free it from anti-assignment protections under Federal law. Ohio caselaw, the dissenting opinion continued, does not support a past/future distinction for handling Social Security benefits. And while trial courts may consider Social Security benefits when dividing marital property, trial courts may not divide these benefits themselves, as marital property. Under 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), Social Security benefits—whether already paid, or to be paid in a future stream of income—are not subject to division. The dissenting opinion agreed with Husband’s cross-assignment of error, finding that the trial court abused its discretion when it divided the derivative benefit evenly.

Janson v. Janson, 2nd Dist. Greene No. 1998 DR 0063, 2025-CA-3, 2025-Ohio-3092

Contempt
Separation Agreement: ambiguity, life insurance (to secure property interest), retirement benefits (military), survivorship

Dated: August 29, 2025
Affirming

As part of their 1998 dissolution, the parties agreed to the equal division of Husband’s military pension, and the purchase and maintenance of a $100,000 term life insurance policy payable to Wife should Husband predecease her. In 2003, Wife filed a show cause motion for contempt, arguing Husband was in breach of their separation agreement, and had failed to maintain the agreed-upon life insurance policy. By agreed entry, Husband was ordered to maintain a new policy with Wife as beneficiary, and Wife waived any claim to survivor benefits from his pension.

In 2024, Wife sought another contempt finding, with attorney fees, when Husband failed to renew the policy. The trial court agreed, finding Husband in contempt and ordering him to obtain a new policy with Wife as beneficiary, to be maintained until either party’s death.

Husband appealed, arguing that the trial court’s contempt finding constituted an abuse of discretion. He argued that the parties’ separation agreement contained no specific timeline, and that the 2004 agreed entry likewise failed to specify how long he would be required to maintain the term life policy. Thus, he was free to let it lapse.

The Court disagreed, noting that the 2004 agreed entry specifically required Husband to maintain the policy, and maintain Wife as its beneficiary:

Here we see “maintain” used twice, and each instance has a distinct meaning. The first “maintain” means “to continue something.” Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). The second means “to support someone financially; especially to pay alimony to.” Id. Given the context, [Husband] was to continue paying for the required life insurance policy to support his ex-wife as the beneficiary. Because there was no time limit placed on the payments, the trial court found (and we agree) that a timeframe had not been intended, and [Husband] is required to maintain the policy until the death of one of [the] parties.

The parties’ 1998 separation agreement required Husband’s purchase of a term life policy, and naming of Wife as its beneficiary. Because other provisions in the agreement included explicit time limits (such as life insurance for the children during minority), the absence of any limit on Wife’s policy demonstrated that no end date was intended. Finally, the Court found that Wife’s release of survivor benefit rights in the 2004 agreed entry further reinforced the ongoing nature of Husband’s obligation. The Court thus affirmed.

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