Kentucky Case Law Review by Topic: May 1, 2025 through June 30, 2025

Higgs v. Higgs, Nos. 22-CI-503310, 2023-CA-1339-MR (Ky. App. 2025)

Civ. R. 60.02: (fraud)
Witness: credibility

Dated: May 2, 2025
Affirming
Not to be Published

Nine months after the trial court’s entry of the decree, Husband filed Civ. R. 60.02 motion for relief from judgment, alleging Wife had fraudulently signed his name on various dissolution documents. The trial court denied the motion, and denied his subsequent motion for additional findings. Husband appealed.

The trial court found that although Husband did not physically sign the documents, he accompanied Wife to the notary and appeared to give his consent for her to sign on his behalf. The trial court rejected Husband’s claim of fraud, concluding he voluntarily participated in the notarization process and had an opportunity to review the papers.

On appeal, the Court affirmed. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Civ. R. 60.02 relief, emphasizing that Husband’s fraud claim rested solely on a factual premise the trial court had already rejected. Because the appellate record lacked the hearing video, the Court presumed the evidence supported the trial court’s findings. The Court reiterated that assessing witness credibility lies within the trial court’s discretion and will not be second-guessed on appeal.

Henson v. Henson, Nos. 23-CI-00003, 2023-CA-1102-MR (Ky. App. 2025)

Marital Property: debts
Remand

Dated: May 23, 2025
Affirming in Part, and Remanding
Not to be Published

Husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in January 2023, following an incident in which Wife held a gun to her own head in front of the parties’ children. Following Wife’s discharge from a mental health facility, Husband sought and was granted entry of a domestic violence order. The trial court granted Husband primary custody of the parties’ children, with Wife allowed temporary supervised visitation.

A final hearing was held, in which the parties, Wife’s therapist, and the children’s therapist testified. A decree was entered, and the trial court awarded Husband sole custody of the children, and denied Wife’s request for Maintenance. Wife appealed, arguing:

1. The trial court erred in awarding Husband sole custody of the children;

2. The trial court erred in not awarding her equal parenting time;

3. The trial court erred in denying her request for maintenance; and

4. The trial court erred when it failed to allocate the parties’ debt, despite the record reflecting agreement by the parties to Husband’s assumption thereof.

Steeped in precedent? Or a bit of a ‘weak tea’ update?

The Court upheld the trial court’s awards of custody and parenting time, noting the domestic violence order entered against Wife, as well as its deference to the trial court’s findings and best-interest considerations for the parties’ children.

The Court likewise affirmed the trial court’s denial of maintenance payments, noting Wife’s part-time employment and lack of documented expenses or personal budget to corroborate her claimed need.

In light of the absence of documented expenses, the lack of any concrete budget, and the availability of part-time income with potential for additional work, the [trial] court was well within its discretion to conclude that [Wife] failed to establish her entitlement to maintenance.

Addressing Wife’s final assignment of error, the Court reaffirmed the obligation of trial courts to divide debts in a just and reasonable manner, considering both parties’ respective incomes and retained property. At the time of the dissolution, the parties owed considerable amounts in tax debts. Further, the record from the final hearing included statements by both parties indicating a willingness and mutual understanding that Husband would assume these tax burdens. The Court thus remanded solely on this issue, back to the trial court for entry of a clear written directive confirming Husband’s responsibility for the tax debt.

Kentucky State Lodge Fraternal Order of Police v. County Employees Retirement System, Nos. 19-CI-000880, 22-CI-00045, 22-CI-00082, 2024-CA-0812-ME, 2024-CA-0813-ME, 2024-CA-00853-ME, 2024-CA-0855-ME (Ky. App. 2025)

Civ. R. 23
KPPA

Dated: May 23, 2025
Affirming
To be Published

In 2014, the Kentucky Public Pensions Authority (then Kentucky Retirement Systems), or KPPA, began terminating retiree health insurance coverage for previously eligible enrollees, based on an interpretation of the Federal Medicare Secondary Payer Statute. KPPA argued that when retirees reached Medicare eligibility at age 65, federal law forbade KPPA from offering coverage which would be secondary to Medicare. A United States District Court disagreed, finding that KPPA improperly applied the statute to retiree health coverage, rather than limiting its application to current employment status. The District Court further noted Kentucky Revised Statute provisions for CERS participants who began participating before 2014, which deemed such retiree health insurance “an inviolable contract of the Commonwealth… not subject to reduction or impairment by alteration, amendment or repeal.” The District Court’s holding was upheld on appeal.

As the dispute over federal law and KPPA’s interpretation was adjudicated, numerous parties began to seek state-level injunctive relief, alleging that KPPA impaired their vested “inviolable contract” rights under the above-noted Kentucky Revised Statute provisions. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief including reinstatement of retiree and spousal health coverage and repayment of premiums for Medicare Part B coverage.

KPPA was restructured in 2022, and the General Assembly revised its statutes to accord with KPPA’s 2014 policy, applying to members who began participating 2014-forward.

The parties sought certification as a class from the trial court, with subclasses based on hazardous or non-hazardous duty (hazardous employee spouses had previously enjoyed coverage at no extra cost, where non-hazardous employee spouses paid premiums), re-employment, and termination of coverage. The trial court found that the parties met the numerosity and commonality requirements of Civ. R. 23.01, to be certified as a class for injunctive and declaratory relief. The trial court did not, however, find that the parties met the requirements for class certification to adjudicate their damages claims.

The parties appealed, arguing that the trial court misapplied the predominance and superiority requirements under Civ. R. 23.02, while KPPA cross-appealed, claiming that no classes should have been certified.

The Court affirmed. It held that the trial court had properly conducted the required rigorous analysis under Civ. R. 23.01 and 23.02, and committed no abuse of discretion. The Court agreed that the parties’ declaratory and injunctive relief claims shared common legal and factual issues, chiefly whether Kentucky’s modification of retiree health benefits breached an ‘inviolable contract.’ The damages claims, however, required individualized proof of costs, coverage choices, and lost income, and were thus ill-suited to treatment as a class. The Court likewise affirmed that the parties had failed to establish the adequacy of their subclass representatives.

On the cross-appeal, the Court rejected KPPA’s argument that the declaratory and injunctive relief subclasses were “fail-safe” or unnecessary. The subclass definitions were sufficiently specific, not contingent on liability findings, and properly structured to avoid inconsistent adjudications across similarly situated retirees. Accordingly, certification of the declaratory and injunctive subclasses was upheld.

Whitfill v. Whitfill, Nos. 16-CI-00051, 2024-CA-1181-MR (Ky. App. 2025)

Property Settlement Agreement

Dated: June 27, 2025
Affirming
Not to be Published

Husband and Wife divorced in 2017 under an agreement granting Wife the marital residence until their youngest child turned 19 or graduated, and requiring Husband to pay $1,282.24 per month in child support, out of which he was to make the mortgage payment and remit the remainder to Wife. The agreement also provided that Husband could take the mortgage interest deduction and would not seek modification as each child reached majority.

After the parties’ middle child turned 18, Husband filed a motion to modify child support. Wife also moved for modification, asserting that Husband’s higher income warranted an increase. Following hearings, the Domestic Relations Commissioner (DRC) recommended modifying Husband’s obligation to $673.69 per month, retroactive to his motion’s filing date. Wife filed exceptions, arguing only that Husband was still obligated to pay the full mortgage in addition to the modified support. The trial court confirmed the DRC’s report, and later denied Wife’s motion for contempt when Husband continued paying only the mortgage, which now exceeded his child support obligation.

On appeal, Wife argued that the mortgage was a marital debt rather than child support, and that Husband should therefore pay both. The Court disagreed, holding that the agreement’s plain language (specifically the section titled “CHILD SUPPORT,” characterizing Husband’s payment of the mortgage from the child support amount ) showed that the parties intended the mortgage payments to be part of the child support obligation, not a separate property settlement. The Court found that the trial court properly treated the issue as one of child support modification under KRS 403.213, rather than property division under KRS 403.250.

Because the recalculated amount represented a change greater than 15%, Husband was entitled to a rebuttable presumption of a substantial and continuing change in circumstances. Wife failed to rebut that presumption, and the Court found no abuse of discretion in the modification. The Court declined to address Wife’s claims of arrearage, noting that the appealed order contained no findings on that issue.

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