Ohio Case Law Review by Topic: December 1, 2025 through January 31, 2026

Powless v. Powless, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2003 DR 00619, 25 CA 00027, 2025-Ohio-5795

Civ. R. 60(B)
DOPO: ambiguity, merely implements decree, subject matter jurisdiction, STRS
Marital Property: disability, retirement benefits
ORC 3105.171(I)

Dated: December 29, 2025
Affirming

As part of the parties’ 2003 divorce, Wife was awarded half of Husband’s “retirement benefits,” which he accrued in his STRS pension. Subsequent to the divorce, Wife became aware of Husband’s receipt of disability payments paid to him by STRS in lieu of his retirement. She filed a Civ. R. 60(B) motion in February 2024, which the trial court ultimately denied. In its ruling, however, the trial court noted underlying ambiguity in the 2003 decree, and suggested Wife seek clarification of the decree’s assignment of benefits, instead. If, the trial court noted, Husband was receiving disability payments in lieu of his retirement pay, then these payments could constitute retirement benefits.

In February 2025, the trial court ordered the submission of evidence by the parties to address whether Husband’s disability payments were being paid in lieu of his retirement. The trial court further ordered Husband’s release and authorization to STRS to disclose information related to his disability benefits. Wife, on subsequent receipt of his benefit information, retained assistance from a firm specializing in retirement division orders. Finding that Husband’s disability entitlement was indeed paid in place of his retirement, the firm prepared an order assigning Wife half of his disability pay, which Wife submitted and the trial court adopted. Husband’s appeal followed.

In his appeal, Husband argued the trial court erred in adopting Wife’s Division of Property Order (DOPO) based on: (a) its prior denial of Wife’s Civ. R. 60(B) motion, barring further consideration of evidence; and (b) the application of Wife’s award to his disability benefits constituting an improper modification of the decree.

Wife sought to dismiss Husband’s appeal, arguing the Court lacked jurisdiction. She argued that the 2025 order was not final and appealable, and merely implements the terms of the 2003 decree. The Court disagreed, finding that—while a QDRO (or DOPO) implements the final, appealable decree, and is typically not appealable—trial courts do retain jurisdiction to interpret ambiguous language in a decree.

The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained that because it is the decree of divorce that constitutes the final determination of the court when a domestic-relations case is resolved on the merits, the divorce decree itself is the final and appealable order, even if the decree calls for the future preparation of a QDRO. Wilson v. Wilson, 2007- Ohio-6056, ¶ 15–16. Based on that logic, a QDRO that adheres to the terms of an earlier issued divorce decree is not an independent final order that may be challenged in an appeal. Dutton v. Dutton, 2025-Ohio-1980, ¶ 22 (10th Dist.); Lamb v. Lamb, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6007, *5 (3d Dist. Dec. 4, 1998)

A trial court, the opinion continues, is not only empowered but obligated to clarify ambiguity in a decree. And thus the trial court’s 2025 decision in this case was a final, appealable order that the Court has jurisdiction to review.

In his appeal, Husband argued that the trial court’s denial of Wife’s Civ. R. 60(B) motion, and finding that Wife had failed to present sufficient evidence that his disability was paid in lieu of retirement benefits, barred consideration of additional evidence concerning his disability payments. Such evidence, he asserted, fell under the doctrine of claim preclusion, wherein “a valid, final judgment… bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.” The Court disagreed, noting trial courts’ authority to hold post-decree hearings to clarify ambiguous decree provisions, and this trial court’s findings (in its dismissal of Wife’s Civ. R. 60(B) motion) that Wife’s motion sought relief from the decree, not clarification. Thus, the trial court’s subsequent order and clarification of the decree (and review of evidence in support thereof) was not barred by its previous denial of a motion which sought relief, instead.

In assigning a share of his disability payments, Husband continued, the trial court improperly ordered the division of his non-marital property. For its review, the Court first made its own determination that the decree language was ambiguous, and then applied an abuse of discretion standard to the trial court’s award. Disability payments, the Court reminds readers, are not considered marital property except when they are received in lieu of retirement payments. In this case, the 2003 decree conveyed Wife an interest in Husband’s “retirement benefits,” without specifically defining those benefits. Evidence submitted by Wife conclusively showed that Husband’s receipt of disability benefits precluded his age/service pension, and could be paid for the remainder of his lifetime, barring a return to work or change in condition. Thus, the award to Wife was not an abuse of discretion, and the trial court correctly treated Husband’s disability as retirement benefits assignable to Wife under the terms of the decree.

Kane v. Kane, 12th Dist. Warren No. 22DR43395, CA2025-03-020, 2026-Ohio-73

Marital Property: de facto date, valuation
Spousal Support: duration of award, imputed income

Dated: January 12, 2026
Affirming

Parties were married for over 26 years. They had two adult children at the time of the divorce. Husband was the managing partner at a large law firm. Wife was also a licensed attorney, but she spent most of the marriage as a homemaker. Wife was in private practice for a few years during the marriage, before leaving the workforce to accommodate Husband’s career and to care for the children. The parties had an affluent lifestyle. Husband had annual income of $1.2 million dollars, and Wife’s last annual salary was $72,000.

The trial court ordered Husband to pay spousal support for eight years, structured in 2 tiers. The Tier I amount, based on Husband’s monthly draws from the law firm, was $6,690,000 [sic] per month. The Tier II amount was 40% of Husband’s net additional income from the law firm. The trial court retained jurisdiction over the amount, but not the term, of the spousal support award. In making its determination, the trial court imputed annual income of $72,000 to Wife.

Wife argued on appeal that the trial court erred in its spousal support determination. She contended that income should not have been imputed. The Court disagreed, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imputing income to wife based on the following: (1) Wife held a law degree and maintained an active license to practice law; (2) she had assisted family and friends in legal matters; (3) she was in good health; and (4) the trial court found that she was intelligent, had meaningful legal experience, and had previously earned a salary equal to the imputed amount.

Wife also argued that the parties never intended for her to return to the workforce. The Court rejected this argument, stating that “plans adopted during the marriage may not be feasible once the marriage breaks down.”

In her second assignment of error, Wife argued that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting spousal support to 8 years. She maintained that 8 years was an exceptionally short duration for a 26-year marriage, and that the trial court, at a minimum, should have reserved jurisdiction over the duration of the award.

The Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, stating that the amount and duration of spousal support depend on the unique facts and circumstances of each case. Since the trial court conducted a comprehensive analysis of the statutory factors set forth in ORC 3105.18, it did not abuse its discretion in determining the duration of spousal support.

Length of marriage was also an issue on appeal. Wife argued that the trial court should not have used the date on which she filed for divorce as a de facto termination date, because approximately 21 months elapsed between the filing of the complaint and the final hearing.

The Court noted that under ORC 3105.171(A)(2), Ohio’s marital property statute presumes that a marriage ends on the date of the final divorce hearing. However, this is only a presumption. The Court held that the trial court did not err in using the date of the filing of the complaint for divorce as the de facto termination date due to the facts of the case, which included (1) the parties separated on less than friendly terms; (2) Wife left the marital residence prior to filing the complaint for divorce and the parties maintained separate residences thereafter; (3) the parties made no attempt at reconciliation; and (4) the parties had not lived together, vacationed together, or interacted beyond a few family functions since separation.

Wife’s seventh assignment of error on appeal was that the trial court erred in the division of Husband’s partnership interest in his law firm. She requested a “coverture share” of the value of his partnership interest. However, Wife offered only general arguments and failed to provide evidence regarding the value of the partnership interest.

The Court noted that a coverture share formula is frequently used in divorce proceedings to divide retirement assets by calculating the marital portion of the asset. In this case, Husband provided evidence that his partnership interest entitled him only to his share of the firm’s profits while he remained a partner. Upon his departure from the firm, he would be entitled to his paid-in capital, with no interest. The trial court awarded Wife one-half of Husband’s paid-in capital and based the spousal support award on Husband’s income from the law firm. The Court thus found the assignment of error to be without merit.

Moniz v. Moniz, 12th Dist. Warren No. 21 DR 42975, CA2025-03-015, 2026-Ohio-159

Marital Property: custodial accounts, double dipping, jurisdiction, separate property, temporary orders, tracing

Dated: January 20, 2026
Affirming

Husband and Wife lived together prior to the marriage and were legally married for 32 years. They had two adult children at the time of trial. The parties had various financial accounts during the marriage. One of these accounts was a Merrill Edge account, claimed by Husband as his separate property. The trial court held that the Merrill Edge account was marital property, and both parties appealed.

Husband claimed that the funds in the Merrill Edge account originated from a Hamilton Standard Credit Union account, and that since only he could make deposits to this account, the funds were therefore his separate property. (The Hamilton Standard account was held in both parties’ names, but the bank was located in a defense contractor building to which only employees had access and Husband was an employee.)

Over time, the Hamilton Standard account became a Merrill Edge account. Wife did not dispute that only Husband, due to his employment, could make deposits to the Hamilton Standard account. However, she argued that there was no evidence that funds deposited into the account prior to marriage originated from Husband’s sole earnings.

Husband’s assignment of error regarding the Merrill Edge account was overruled. A party claiming a separate interest in property must establish that interest by a preponderance of the evidence. In other words, this standard requires the claiming party to prove that it is more likely than not that the asset in question is indeed separate property, rather than marital property subject to division. Separate property includes any real or personal property acquired by one party prior to the marriage.

Husband was unable to produce documents regarding the source of funds deposited into the Hamilton Standard account more than thirty years prior to trial. The Court held that even though Husband was the only party who could have physically deposited funds into the Hamilton Standard account, that did not make it more likely than not that the account was Husband’s separate property. Prior to the marriage, the parties had both separate and joint accounts. Husband presented no evidence that the money used to start the Hamilton Standard account came solely from his separate money.

Husband’s second assignment of error was that the trial court erred in determining that rental income which accrued during the pendency of the divorce was marital property. During the divorce, the trial court first ordered temporary spousal support, then the parties entered a Temporary Agreed Entry requiring Husband to pay Wife’s rent and other expenses. The Temporary Agreed Entry did not mention income from the rental home.

Husband reasoned that because a previous temporary order acknowledged that his income included rental income, and since he was paying spousal support from all sources, the division of the rental income account amounted to “double dipping.” The Court also noted that Husband failed to quantify the alleged double dipping, and his argument was undermined by his testimony that he only withdrew funds from the rental-income account to pay rental-property expenses.

Husband’s second assignment of error was overruled. The Temporary Agreed Entry was temporary in nature and subject to modification. The trial court determined the rental home, as well as the income derived from it during the pendency, to be marital property. That classification was not contested on appeal. Due to the temporary nature of the support orders during the pendency of the divorce, and the fact that there was no formal explanation regarding how the parties arrived at their agreement, the Temporary Agreed Order carried limited, if any, weight regarding the classification and distribution of the rental income account as marital property.

Wife also argued that the trial court erred by using the final $512,500 purchase price of Husband’s post-marital home, rather than the $515,000 value stated in the parties’ Temporary Agreed Entry, when offsetting marital assets. The Court overruled this assignment of error. Wife argued that the Temporary Agreed Entry was a binding contract, but the Court held that she did not establish why the temporary order should be treated as a binding settlement agreement. Because the temporary order reflected the facts as they existed at that moment, the Court found, and the purchase price was later reduced after inspection, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by using the actual purchase price.

Finally, Wife assigned as error the failure of the trial court to address custodial accounts for the parties’ adult children. The divorce decree was silent on the issue. Citing ORC 5814.01(D), ORC 5814.04 and Brown v. Brown, 2009-Ohio-2204, the Court held that under Ohio law, a domestic relations court has no jurisdiction over custodial property, including securities, money, and other property supervised by a child’s custodian. Jurisdiction over such accounts is reserved for probate courts. The Court noted similar holdings in the 9th, 6th, and 3rd appellate districts.

Meranda v. Meranda, 12th Dist. Brown No. DR20230640, CA2025-05-009, 2026-Ohio-221

Marital Property: financial misconduct, passive appreciation, separate property, tracing

Dated: January 26, 2026
Affirming

Husband owned a winery prior to marriage to Wife. During the marriage, the parties signed a mortgage on the winery property for $199,286. At no time did Husband add Wife’s name to the winery deed. Husband and Wife successfully operated the winery for 5 years until chemicals from a nearby farm damaged their grape vines and limited production. Thereafter, the winery struggled to remain profitable.

After 10 years of marriage, Husband filed for divorce. During the divorce, Wife obtained a civil protection order against Husband. Husband could not work at the winery due to the protection order, and Wife never made any other arrangements to take care of the vines or winery equipment in his absence.

The trial court awarded Husband the entirety of the winery business. Wife was awarded a one-half interest in reduction of principal on the mortgage during the marriage. Wife appealed.

Wife’s first assignment of error was that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding all of the winery business to Husband. She argued that she established a marital interest subject to equitable distribution.

Wife contended that she traced the use of her separate funds from the sale of a Michigan house to various improvements in the winery business, including a kitchen remodel, new flooring and furnishings, as well as purchases of vines, a leaf remover, and chemicals. Wife also managed the winery’s tasting room and contributed her various paychecks and social security checks to the marriage. Wife argued that the trial court should have awarded her a one-half share of the winery.

The assignment of error was overruled. Husband owned the winery prior to the marriage, and thus the Court found it was his separate property pursuant to ORC 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(ii). The refinancing of separate property after a subsequent marriage alone does not convert separate property into marital property. Further, any passive income and appreciation on separate property remains separate property. ORC 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(iii).

However, if the value of the separate property appreciates due to labor, monetary, or in-kind contribution of either spouse, the appreciation is marital property. Wife failed to satisfy her burden to prove that improvements she made to the winery caused an appreciation in its value. It is well established that routine maintenance and cosmetic changes generally do not convert appreciation from separate to marital property. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Wife was not entitled to any interest in the winery beyond one-half of the mortgage reduction.

In her second assignment of error, Wife claimed that the trial court improperly found that she committed financial misconduct and harm to the winery business. Wife argued that the civil protection order did not prevent Husband from operating the winery business, and that Husband failed to arrange time for entry onto the winery property through his attorney. Wife also contended that Husband contributed to the dissipation of the winery’s assets by failing to conduct maintenance before and after the trial court’s order granting him access to the business.

The Court held that pursuant to ORC 3105.171(E)(4), financial misconduct includes, but is not limited to, “the dissipation, destruction, concealment, nondisclosure, or fraudulent disposition of assets.” Financial misconduct implies some type of wrongdoing such as interference with the other spouse’s property rights. Garcia v. Samano, 2019-Ohio-3223 (12th Dist.).

Wife never made arrangements to take care of the vines or winery equipment during Husband’s absence. This led to equipment being damaged, spoilage of product, and the destruction of vines. Further, Wife never gave a full accounting for all wine sales, and she freely deposited business funds in her personal account and those of her children. The Court affirmed the trial court’s award of all the winery business to Husband, stating that the trial court properly found that Wife intentionally defeated Husband’s attempts to operate the winery and took the winery’s limited profit for herself.

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