Ohio Case Law Review by Topic: March 1, 2025 through April, 2025

Parsai v. Parsai, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. DR-23-395292. 113550, 113747, 2025-Ohio-829

Civ. R. 75(N)
Marital Property: equalization, de facto date (marriage, termination of marriage), retirement benefits (STRS), valuation
Spousal Support: modification (change in circumstances), retirement benefits

Dated: March 13, 2025
Affirming

The parties met in 1980, and while some dispute arose during the divorce proceedings over whether their 1989 civil marriage date constituted the start of the marriage—or their earlier exchanging of religious vows—the question was ultimately moot for property division or spousal support purposes. Both parties were academically successful, and Husband earned substantial income as the family’s breadwinner.

Wife obtained her own Ph.D. during the marriage, and opened her own daycare, though ownership and income therefrom was reported under Husband’s name. The parties separated in 2017, Wife spent some time in Iran, and Husband made repeated attempts at reconciliation with promises of better treatment. Wife took up residence with their daughter, Husband unilaterally sold the daycare and the parties’ marital home (sending Wife what he deemed her share of the proceeds, from the latter), and Wife filed for divorce in August 2019. Alongside her complaint, she filed a motion for temporary support.

After some time elapsed, the trial court ruled on Wife’s motion in March 2022, awarding her $5,000/month in spousal support retroactive to January 2020. In its award to Wife, the trial court conveyed some doubt regarding Husband’s alleged retirement from his faculty position—for which he was immediately rehired while also beginning to receive STRS benefits—and rejected Husband’s assertion that his arrearage should be offset by his payment to Wife from the proceeds of the sale of the marital home. Such proceeds, the trial court noted, were marital property subject to separate accounting and division from spousal support. Husband was ordered to commence payments of an additional $2,000/month toward the arrearage.

Husband filed a Civ. R. 75(N)(2) motion immediately thereafter, but failed to include any documentary support or specify a legal rationale for why the trial court’s spousal support award was unreasonable.

Following multiple days of trial over several months, the parties agreed to dismiss their original action and refile, now with Husband as plaintiff. The parties stipulated that the trial court’s orders in the previous matter would remain in effect in the current case, but Husband later opposed the filing of transcripts and exhibits from the previous case as evidence. The matter advanced to trial without transcripts and exhibits from the previous case, and a decree of divorce was issued in December 2023.

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In its decree, the trial court utilized final hearing date of 10/11/2023, deeming the 2017 de facto date proposed by Husband inappropriate and unpractical, given that no evidence as to property values as of that date had been submitted. The trial court ordered the sale of four parcels of real estate, with the proceeds divided evenly, but the sales fees/costs paid for by Husband as a sanction for his transfer of properties in violation of a mutual restraining order. The trial court likewise ordered the division or assignment to either party of other property/assets, including: vehicles, bank and credit union accounts, and Husband’s STRS and Ohio Deferred Compensation Plan benefits. The trial court also ordered the liquidation and the division of proceeds from an annuity and whole life policy held by Husband. Husband was ordered to pay $1,500 to Wife for his lifetime, but retained jurisdiction to modify its award if either party died or Wife cohabitated or remarried. Finally, the trial court reduced Husband’s prior spousal support arrearage to $190,000. Following some additional motions by the parties, Husband appealed, and Wife cross-appealed.

In his first assignment of error, Husband alleged the trial court erred when it failed to use the 2017 de facto date of the parties’ initial separation. Noting the presumption that a date of final hearing is used as the date of termination of marriage, the Court affirmed the trial court’s use of 10/11/2023 as the marital end date. A trial court, the Court wrote, may in its own judgment utilize a different date if it finds the use of a different date may yield a more equitable result. When a de facto date is used, the Court continued, it is “must be clear and bilateral,” and reflect the actions of both parties. Here, the end date proposed by Husband was based on Wife’s actions alone, and preceded years of continued financial entanglement and Husband’s repeated attempts at reconciliation. Finally, the trial court rightly determined—the Court wrote—that the use of a 2017 de facto date would severely hamper any accurate division and valuation of the parties various assets as of that date, as it had little to no evidence to support such calculations. While case law may support the use of a de facto date in matters where the parties were not intimate after their separation, maintained separate residences, and did not vacation or attend events together, such a de facto date would not be appropriate in this matter, where the separation was unilateral and the parties remained deeply financially entangled (and continued filing joint tax returns).

In his second assignment of error, Husband argued that the trial court erred and abused its discretion when it failed to modify the March 2022 temporary support order based on his retirement. The Court conceded that Husband filed a Civ. R. 75(N)(2) motion immediately after the temporary support order was entered, but in its Opinion points out that this motion could not possibly have been arisen from or been based on his retirement, which would not occur until September, later that year. No hearing on Husband’s motion occurred, nor did he prosecute it in the parties’ refiled action. Husband could not, the Court wrote, argue that the trial court failed to rule on arguments he never actually raised. It also appeared to the Court that Husband’s arguments relied on changed circumstances which only occurred after his motion was filed. Finally, the Court noted, Husband continued to earn significant income even after his retirement/rehiring. The Court again affirmed.

In his third assignment of error, Husband asserted that the trial court failed to credit him for payments to Wife during the pendency of the divorce, amounting to $410,552. The Court again disagreed, finding the trial court equitably credited Husband’s direct payments as property division separate from his spousal support obligations. In response to Husband’s argument that the trial court failed to abide by requirements set forth in Zona v. Zona, 9th Dist. Medina No. 02 DR 0732, 05CA0007-M, 2005-Ohio-5194, and failed to value the marital assets prior to deciding on their division, the Court wrote:

While we have cited Zona in cases involving the division of marital assets, we have nevertheless held that “when a party fails to present evidence as to the value of an item, it is akin to an invited error and that party has waived the right to appeal in regard to that asset.” Tyler v. Tyler, 2010-Ohio-1428, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.). See also Gray v. Gray, 2011-Ohio-4091, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.); Davis v. Davis, 2003-Ohio-4657, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.) (husband waived arguments regarding valuation of marital property where he failed to submit evidence of valuation at trial).

The Court likewise rejected Husband’s fourth and fifth arguments, finding the trial court: (A) had not violated Husband’s due process rights in its impositions of time limits at trial; and (B) committed no error when it denied his motion for a new trial.

In her cross-appeal, Wife first alleged that the trial court erred in its use of the parties’ civil marriage as the marital start date, rather than their earlier private exchange of vows and religious ceremony. The Court rejected Wife’s assertion, finding she failed to demonstrate how the use of a later date prejudiced her.

In her second assignment of error Wife argued that the trial court erred and abused its discretion by: (a) failing to divide Husband’s STRS pension; (b) its spousal support award of only $1,500/month; and (c) in its division of marital property. Agreeing with Wife that marital pensions are by default marital assets, subject to consideration and factors listed under ORC 3105.18, the Court nonetheless affirmed the trial court decision, finding that the trial court expressly considered the STRS pension in its analysis, ultimately treating it as income from which Wife’s spousal support was awarded. Further, Wife was awarded substantial marital property assets, which Husband’s poor health may render more valuable than the STRS pension (payable over his lifetime). The Court thus affirmed.

Brodbeck v. Brodbeck, 5th Dist. Delaware No. DR B 01 0048, 24 CAF 07 0043, 2025-Ohio-980

DOPO: abuse of discretion, coverture, valuation
Marital Property: equalization, omitted assets
STRS

Dated: March 20, 2025
Affirming

The parties married in 2018, and filed countering motions for divorce in 2022. Wife was a schoolteacher throughout the marriage and participated in/accrued pension benefits under STRS. Wife was initially awarded 100% of her STRS pension via magistrate’s decision, but the trial court overturned this, and awarded Husband half of the marital portion of the benefits. The trial court ordered the preparation and entry of a Division of Property Order (DOPO) to effectuate the assignment.

Husband was awarded several business entities in which he had an ownership interest, none of which generated significant income. Husband’s business interests were determined to have no value by the trial court. Wife’s appeal followed.

In her first assignment of error, Wife argued that the trial court erred in its valuation of marital accruals in her STRS account. During the proceedings, the magistrate utilized fiscal year-end statements for Wife’s benefits from 06/30/2018 and 06/30/2021 and deemed Husband’s marital interest to be half the ‘withdrawal value’ increase shown therein. Husband objected to the magistrate’s decision, arguing that a coverture formula was the correct means of calculating a marital interest in a pension (like Wife’s STRS). The trial court reversed the magistrate in its award of the pension to Wife as her separate property, but accepted the increase in ‘withdrawal values’ as representing the marital portion.

Editor’s note: The trial court does two seemingly contradictory things here, in ordering assignment via DOPO and accepting the increase in ‘withdrawal values’ as representative of the increase in the marital portion. While alternative means of division are available via DOPO, experience in DOPO division indicates that a coverture assignment might nonetheless get utilized, absent some nuanced calculation not specified in the Opinion. Other trial court references to gains/losses indicate common misunderstandings of this type of benefit and its underlying benefit formula. While in this case, the length of the marriage was notably short, practitioners should be aware that withdrawal values are not representative of an age/service pension’s full net present value.

The Court rejected Wife’s first assignment of error, and deemed the trial court’s valuation and division of the pension reasonable.

In her second assignment of error, Wife alleged the trial court failed to offset the marital portion of her STRS pension against Husband’s Social Security benefits accrued during the marriage. The magistrate’s decision, however, found that Husband had not earned sufficient credits to be entitled to Social Security benefits. In her objections to the Magistrate’s decision, Wife failed to reference this finding, and thus Wife’s right to appeal on this issue—the Court found—was forfeited.

Wife’s appeal went on to allege financial misconduct on Husband’s part, asserting his failure to disclose interest in a consulting business. The Court again affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding that the business entity in mention lacked any income or value. Thus, Husband’s disclosure or nondisclosure of this business could not amount to financial misconduct. Further and as noted by the trial court before, Husband provided bank and financial records and ample accounting for his finances and assets during the proceedings.

As Wife failed to raise objections to the trial court’s handling of the parties’ 2020 tax refund during the proceedings, she waived her ability to raise the issue now on appeal. The Court again affirmed the trial court’s decision.

The Court likewise rejected Wife’s fifth assignment of error, finding Husband’s assets had been properly and adequately identified and valued as part of the proceedings. Finally, the Court rejected Wife’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, finding such claim insufficient grounds for a reversal of the trial court’s judgment.

Kohn v. Kohn, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 17 DR B 09 0530, 24 CAF 07 0047, 2025-Ohio-1052

Spousal Support: definition of income, modification (change in circumstances)

Dated: March 25, 2025
Affirming

As part of the parties’ 2018 divorce, the parties each received $3,447,802 in marital assets, and Wife was awarded $16,995/month for spousal support. Said support was deemed “modifiable/terminable in the event of a change in circumstances,” including Husband’s retirement. As part of the division of marital property, Husband retained ownership of a business asset he sold in 2019 for a profit of $16 million after taxes.

In 2022, Husband retired, and filed a motion to terminate spousal support. In 2023 Wife filed a motion to modify spousal support, and a magistrate’s hearing followed. The magistrate denied both parties’ motions, leaving the spousal support obligation intact, and the trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision, overruling Husband’s objections. Husband’s appeal followed.

On appeal, Husband argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion. He argued that his retirement was undisputed, and that it clearly qualified as a change in circumstances under the decree. The Court disagreed. While it acknowledged provisions of the decree wherein spousal support was “modifiable/terminable” in the event of a change in circumstances, the mere existence of such a change would not itself warrant the modification or termination of Wife’s spousal support award.

“[I]n order to modify or terminate spousal support, a change in circumstances must be substantial and make the existing award ‘no longer reasonable and appropriate.’” While it acknowledged Husband’s decrease in regular income, following retirement, the Court found that—taking into account the capital gains and investment income stemming from his company’s sale—the actual difference in income remained slight. Whereas Wife’s ability to generate income had not changed, and was far less than Husband’s.

The Court cited the magistrate’s decision, which wrote:

54. Based upon the parties' respective incomes at the time of divorce, the spousal support order resulted in an approximate after-tax income division of 55% to [Husband] and 45% to [Wife].

55. Based upon the current incomes of the parties, the spousal support order results in an approximate after-tax income division of 54% to [Husband] and 46% to [Wife].

56. The Court finds that, after consideration of all of the factors set forth in ORC 3105.18(C)(l), the support Order remains appropriate and reasonable.

Finding that the magistrate/trial court committed no abuse of discretion in considering Husband’s income “from all sources” under ORC 3105.18(C)(l)(a), the Court thus affirmed.

Wilkes v. Wilkes, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 23DR-3519, 24AP-210, 2025-Ohio-1031

Marital Property: de facto date

Dated: March 25, 2025
Reversing

The parties married in 1997, and Husband filed for divorce in 2023. Though she received service of summons, Wife failed to answer, and an uncontested hearing on Husband’s complaint followed. Wife appeared at the hearing pro se, and requested more time from the trial court. The trial court heard testimony from Husband and Husband’s brother, attesting that the parties had been living separately, did not hold themselves out as married or maintain intimate relations, vacation together, or share bank accounts/residences. Wife was not permitted to present evidence or cross-examine the witnesses, and the trial court entered a decree of divorce later that day.

In its decree, the trial court adopted the de facto marital end date provided by Husband of 09/30/2007. Wife appealed, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) denying her a continuance of the final hearing; (2) denying her the opportunity to participate in the hearing, despite Civ. R. 75(F) requirements in divorce proceedings; (3) its use of a de facto date without providing justification or supporting analysis; (4) failing to value the marital property in its division thereof; and (5) failing to make findings concerning the equitability of the marital property division, or showing that factors in ORC 3105.171(F) were considered.

As for the first assignment of error, the Court affirmed the trial court’s denial: the trial court did not err, because Wife failed to make her request via proper motion. On the other hand, the Court agreed with Wife’s second assignment of error. Wife correctly argued the trial court’s misapplication of Civ. R. 55 and treatment of her as in default, when under Civ. R. 75(F) such provisioning should not apply to divorce proceedings. A party may still appear at and participate in the final hearing, even if they failed to answer a complaint for divorce, the Court wrote.

“A judgment of divorce entered after a court bars the non-answering spouse from meaningful participation in the divorce trial is, in effect, a default judgment.” Wood v. Hein, 2014-Ohio-5564, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.), citing McKenzie v. McKenzie, 2013-Ohio-4859, ¶ 4 (3d Dist.).

Husband cited Wife’s verbal response to the trial court judge at the hearing, when asked if she was “here for an uncontested divorce” as evincing her intentions not to participate. The Court disagreed, finding Wife’s verbal acknowledgement could not be construed as a waiver of her right to participate. Wife’s presence at the hearing, itself, demonstrated her intent to the contrary. The Court thus sustained Wife’s second assignment of error.

Because the Court must remand the matter back to the trial court for a new evidentiary hearing, it found that Wife’s other assignments of error were moot. On remand, the trial court will conduct a new evidentiary hearing and make required findings under ORC 3105.171.

Meddock v. Meddock, 2nd Dist. Darke No. 22CV00430, 2024-CA-11, 2025-Ohio-1087

Marital Property: real property, subject matter jurisdiction

Dated: March 28, 2025
Reversing and Remanding

Resulting from the parties’ 2014 divorce (filed in Fayette County), Husband was awarded sole ownership of marital property in Darke County, which he agreed to refinance in his name and thereafter pay Wife $75,000 for her interest in the property. Failing this, the property would be sold and Wife’s interest collected from the proceeds.

Husband neither refinanced the property nor paid Wife her awarded interest, leading to a 2020 civil judgment in Fayette County, and order to pay Wife $75,000. The Fayette County trial court dismissed Husband’s requests for relief from portions of and clarification of the decree, finding—absent mutual agreement by the parties to modify the decree—it lacked jurisdiction as more than one year had elapsed post-decree. Wife subsequently filed a complaint for partition and execution of judgment in Darke County, naming Husband and lienholders on the house as defendants, and requesting the partition of the property and payment to her of $75,000 from its proceeds.

In his answer to Wife’s complaint, Husband countered that the partition action constituted a “collateral attack” on the decree, and was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Other defendants/lien holders filed motions for summary judgment. The Darke County trial court ultimately dismissed without prejudice, finding it lacked jurisdiction and that Wife’s claims were better adjudicated through post-decree actions in Fayette County. Wife’s appeal followed.

Wife argued that the Darke County trial court erred in its sua sponte dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, when the property’s location in Darke County rendered sole jurisdiction over the partition action to the Darke County trial court. She similarly argued that the Darke County trial court erred in its dismissal of her foreclosure action, when the property’s location again granted the trial court sole jurisdiction thereover.

The Court agreed, finding that the Darke County trial court misapplied the doctrine of res judicata in dismissing Wife’s action, and retained subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the same. The transfer of the property to Husband, the Court noted, was contingent on payment that never occurred. Citing Foster v. Foster, 1986 WL 10318 (2d Dist. Sept. 19, 1986), the Court emphasized that a party retains co-ownership rights unless and until the conditions for divestiture are met. Where payment was a triggering event, non-payment left Wife’s ownership interest intact and entitled her to seek partition to enforce her rights under the decree.

Finding thus, the Court reversed and remanded the matter back to the Darke County trial court for further proceedings.

Williams v. Williams, 12th Dist. Clermont No. 2021 DRB 01413, CA2024-06-051, 2025-Ohio-1319

Marital Property: debts, gift, laches, loans

Dated: April 14, 2025
Reversing and Remanding

The parties married in 1991 and separated in 2019. Throughout the marriage, they acquired multiple residential and rental properties. Husband also ran a masonry business, and parties started an unsuccessful courier service. In 2021, they began experiencing financial difficulties, and missed mortgage and real estate payments on their properties. Husband reached out to his sister, who advanced the parties substantial sums totaling $182,870 for use toward outstanding mortgage and tax payments, repairs, and legal fees related to their real estate holdings. Husband’s sister made additional financial advances to Husband, personally and for his business. Husband’s sister eventually acquired several of the parties’ properties through her LLC.

The matter advanced to trial in March 2023, during which the trial court deemed a $2,000 loan to Wife marital and subject to repayment from both parties, and a $5,979 advance to Husband’s business a gift to him alone. In its findings, the trial court noted Husband’s sister’s professional and financial background, and the absence of any loan agreement or repayments made, as well as Wife’s lack of knowledge of the advance. Husband’s appeal followed.

Husband raised one assignment of error, alleging the trial court erred in finding the funds advanced to him for his business were non-marital, and his to repay alone. He argued the trial court failed to explain the basis for its assignment of the loan to him, and failed to classify his sister’s other advances as marital debt, separate debt, or gifts. The Court found that the trial court failed to fully classify or address all of Husband’s sister’s advances, in the absence of which the Court could not review whether the property division—including the $5,979 advance—was fair and equitable. The Court thus remanded the matter back to the trial court to determine the nature and allocation of the outstanding liabilities, and to issue appropriate findings that would support its unequal division of property.

Evans v. Evans, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 21DR-3742, 23AP-525, 2025-Ohio-1470

Marital Property: de facto date, equitable division, valuation
ORC 3105.171(I)
Spousal Support

Dated: April 24, 2025
Affirming and Reversing

The parties married in 2013, and during the marriage Husband owned and operated a logistics entity that operated and maintained trucks owned by his transportation business employer. Husband’s business operated under contract and provided maintenance for the vehicles, paid expenses for the contracted drivers, and paid a weekly lease to the employer company.

Husband filed for divorce in 2021, and during the proceedings Wife sought to add his business as a party to the case. The trial court overruled Wife’s motion, finding she failed to argue or prosecute it. Prior to trial in 2023, Wife’s counsel withdrew with leave of the trial court. Wife filed no motions until trial months later, at which time she sought a continuance to obtain new counsel. Wife represented to the trial court that she had believed her former counsel would continue representing her. Wife alleged that she had communicated with her former attorney around the time of their motion to withdraw, and offered to pay an additional retainer following which no further actions or exchanges occurred. The trial court was unsympathetic to Wife’s account, and denied her motion for a continuance.

The trial court issued a decree dividing property, denying spousal support, and adopting a de facto termination date of 04/15/2022, when Husband left the marital residence.

The trial court assigned a value to the marital residence of $255,000, based on a March 2022 appraisal, used a May 2023 mortgage balance of $184,168, and found marital equity in the home totaling $70,831. The parties were awarded their respective vehicles, Husband a camper, and both parties were awarded their individual bank accounts as separate property. No spousal support was awarded.

Wife appealed, arguing numerous errors including that the trial court erred when it: denied her motion for continuance to obtain new counsel; utilized a de facto termination date of marriage without findings to support its findings; utilized values as of different dates in determining the amount of equity in the residence; failed to order the marital residence sold; assigned no value to Husband’s business, and expenses therefrom paid by Husband’s employer; provided no findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its division of property; awarded her no spousal support.

Much of the dispute centered around Husband’s business. The trial court credited Husband’s testimony that the business was not profit-generating and had no substantial assets, functioning as a passthrough operation between a larger transportation firm and independent truckers. Although Wife sought a $250,000 distributive award based on her support of the business during the marriage, the trial court found the LLC was Husband’s separate property and declined to assign it value. It similarly rejected Wife’s claim that the business provided income to Husband beyond his wages.

The Court largely affirmed. It found no abuse of discretion in the denial of Wife’s motion for a continuance, nor in the use of a de facto date of termination of the marriage. Similarly, the Court found the calculation of marital equity by the trial court was supported by evidence in the records. As for Husband’s business, the Court found that Wife’s arguments rested on her allegation, only, that Husband misled the trial court, with no evidence as to its supposed value identified in the record. The Court did, however, reverse on two grounds. First, it held that the trial court failed to make the written findings of fact required by ORC 3105.171(G) to support its determination that the property division was equitable. While the decree contained detailed spousal support findings under ORC 3105.18(C)(1), it made no reference to ORC 3105.171(F) or comparable findings to support its property division. Second, because the spousal support ruling may have been affected by the property division, the Court reversed and remanded on that issue as well.

All other assignments of error were overruled, including Wife’s challenges to the de facto date, denial of continuance, and valuation of the marital home and Husband’s business.

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