Kentucky Case Law Review by Topic: September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025

Motter v. Motter, Nos. 23-CI-00282, 2024-CA-1369-MR (Ky. App. 2025)

KRS 454.220
Marital Property: abuse of discretion, division, standard of review
Remand

Dated: September 12, 2025
Reversing and Remanding
To be Published

The parties separated in February 2022, following which Husband relocated to Pennsylvania in April 2022. Wife filed for dissolution in September 2023. Her first attempt to serve the petition was returned undelivered, and her second attempt was signed for by a third-party sharing Husband’s surname. A final hearing was held in May 2024, and Husband neither appeared at the hearing nor filed any responses to Wife’s petition beforehand. The trial court entered a decree, awarding Wife the marital residence and certain assets, and Husband various personal property, vehicles, and an annuity account. Wife was also credited with having paid a portion of the marital debt.

Several months later, Husband entered a special appearance and moved to set aside the property division, asserting that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction under KRS 454.220 because Wife filed the action more than 1 year after he became a nonresident of Kentucky.

KRS 454.220:
A court in any matrimonial action or family court proceeding involving a demand for support, alimony, maintenance, distributive awards, or special relief in matrimonial actions may exercise personal jurisdiction over the respondent or defendant notwithstanding the fact that he or she no longer is a resident or domiciliary of this state, or over his or her executor or administrator, if the party seeking support is a resident of or domiciled in this state at the time the demand is made, if this state was the matrimonial domicile of the parties before their separation; the defendant abandoned the plaintiff in this state; or the claim for support, alimony, maintenance, distributive awards, or special relief in matrimonial actions accrued under the laws of this state. The action shall be filed within one (1) year of the date the respondent or defendant became a nonresident of, or moved his domicile from, this state. Service of process may be made by personal service if the defendant or respondent is found within the state or by service through the use of KRS 454.210(3).

Arguing the trial court had made no ruling for a distributive award, Wife argued KRS 454.210(2)(f) applied, based on the parties’ marital residence:

(2) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who is a party to a civil action on any basis consistent with the Constitution of Kentucky and the Constitution of the United States, including but not limited to the person’s: . . . (f) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this Commonwealth, providing the claim arises from the interest in, use of, or possession of the real property, provided, however, that such in personam jurisdiction shall not be imposed on a nonresident who did not himself or herself voluntarily institute the relationship, and did not knowingly perform, or fail to perform, the act or acts upon which jurisdiction is predicated[.]

The trial court agreed, finding it retained personal jurisdiction under KRS 454.210(2)(f), and the 1-year limitation under KRS 454.220 did not apply, because its division of the marital estate did not constitute a distributive award. The trial court acknowledged that controlling statute and case law in Kentucky does not define whether a distributive award encompasses the division of marital property. It noted Ohio’s definition whereunder a distributive award is not made from marital property, and instead involves separate property. Husband appealed.

To support its analysis and opinion, the Court noted its application of a de novo standard of review, and its obligation to “look to the common meaning of the particular words chosen” (when interpreting statute). Additionally, a Court must consider the whole of a statute, and avoid overemphasis on any single word or provision.

In its opinion, the Court hinges its decision on the proper definition and interpretation of what constitutes a distributive award. Because Kentucky statute lacks a clearly defined meaning for a distributive award—as compared to Ohio’s separate property application—the Court relied on the term’s common usage, and Black’s Law Dictionary.

Distribute is defined as “1. To apportion; to divide among several.[;] 2. To arrange by class or order.[;] 3. To deliver.[;] 4. To spread out; to disperse.” Distribute, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). Distributive is defined as “[o]f, relating to, or involving the apportionment, division, or assignment of separate items or shares; pertaining to distribution.” Distributive, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). We believe these definitions support our conclusion that a distributive award includes the division of marital property. To distribute means to divide.

The Court further held that the rules of statutory construction mandate that when two statutes conflict, the more specific one controls. KRS 454.210 is a general long-arm statute, whereas KRS 454.220 is a specific long-arm statute governing matrimonial and family court proceedings. Thus, the Court wrote, KRS 454.220 would apply. The Court noted additional support for its findings in KRS 403.190(1), governing the assignment of property when a court lacks personal jurisdiction in a dissolution proceeding.

Finally, the Court found that—at the time of the decree—a different version of KRS 454.210 (than the current language above) was in effect. The trial court relied on the current statute in its denial of Husband’s motion, but at the time of the decree, personal jurisdiction under KRS 454.210(2) would have been limited to claims arising from the marital residence itself, and not the full range of marital assets and debts addressed in the decree. Under the previous construction, a court’s long-arm jurisdiction to adjudicate claims was limited—when based solely on the statute—to matters specifically enumerated therein.

Perry v. Perry, Nos. 18-CI-50340, 2024-CA-0865-MR (Ky. App. 2025)

Civ. R. 60.02: fraud, mistake
Marital Property: retirement benefits (railroad)

Dated: September 26, 2025
Affirming
Not to be Published

During the marriage, Husband retired from railroad employment after 39 years of service, the majority of which predated the marriage. In addition to his own retirement benefits, Wife received a spousal annuity through the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB). Following a 2019 final hearing, the trial court adopted findings and a decree tendered by Wife that found the parties had stipulated to her continued entitlement to the spousal annuity from Husband’s RRB pension.

Several months later, Husband sought Civ. R. 60.02 relief related to other portions of the marital estate. As part of their resolution of these claims, the parties entered an agreed order expressly waiving any rights to appeal.

In 2023, Husband was notified his benefits would be reduced by the amount awarded to Wife in the decree. Husband filed motions for Civ. R. 60.01 and Civ. R. 60.02(d), (e), and (f) relief, arguing that the decree and award of benefits to Wife conflicted with the trial court’s oral rulings, was unsupported by evidence, and was inequitable based on the benefits having largely accrued pre-maritally. The trial court denied Husband’s motion, finding no fraud, no grounds under Civ. R. 60, and that Husband had waived his right to appeal by prior agreement. Husband appealed.

In his appeal, Husband failed to provide any basis for relief from the trial court’s denial of his 2023 motion. His arguments focused solely on the decree rather than the order on appeal, leaving the Court no arguments to adjudicate.

Editor’s note: This opinion states that Wife’s spousal annuity during the marriage was paid separate and in addition to Husband’s. A reader might ask why his benefit was then reduced in 2023. RRB retirement benefits are paid in two separate ‘tiers,’ with the first paid to spouses or former spouses with or without a court order. ‘Tier II’ benefits are only assigned upon receipt and implementation of a partition order, which event could explain the reduction in this case.

Bruner v. Matheny, Nos. 21-CI-00195, 2024-CA-1378-MR (Ky. App. 2025)

Marital Property: house
Property Settlement Agreement

Dated: October 3, 2025
Affirming
Not to be Published

As part of the parties’ 2016 dissolution, Husband was awarded the former marital residence, which had minimal equity at the time, and Wife executed a quitclaim deed conveying her interest to Husband. The property settlement agreement expressly provided that its terms could not be modified except by mutual written agreement and was incorporated into the decree. Several years later, following the sale of the property, Wife and the parties’ son asserted that Husband had previously agreed—outside the four corners of the decree—that the son would receive one-half of the net sale proceeds, purportedly representing Wife’s former interest in the property.

The trial court rejected that claim, concluding that no enforceable written modification existed and that a document drafted by the son and later signed by the parties failed for lack of consideration. The trial court emphasized that Wife no longer held any ownership interest in the property after executing the quitclaim deed (nor was her equity interest substantial at that time), and that the son had given nothing of value in exchange for Husband’s alleged promise. Wife and the son appealed.

The Court applied a de novo standard, reviewing the property settlement agreement under settled contract principles. Where the terms of an agreement are unambiguous, the Court wrote, the parties’ intent must be derived from the four corners of the document, without resort to extrinsic evidence. The Court agreed with the trial court that the agreement clearly vested ownership of the property to Husband, and expressly prohibited its oral or informal modification.

The Court further rejected Wife’s argument that a separate oral agreement existed outside the decree, noting that such an arrangement was barred by the agreement itself. Even had such occurred, the Court held that the essential elements of a valid contract—particularly consideration—were absent. Wife had already divested herself of interest in the property and had nothing to bargain away, and the son had provided no consideration whatsoever. The Court thus affirmed.

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