Ohio Case Law Review by Topic: August 1, 2024 through October 31, 2024

Dhillon v. Dhillon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. DR-95-244330, 113746, 2024-Ohio-3022

Contempt
Marital Property: laches, retirement benefits (OPERS)

Dated: August 8, 2024
Affirming

Consequent to the parties’ 1998 divorce, Husband was awarded $50,000 as part of the division of property, paid in $500 monthly increments from Wife’s public employee pension. In 2023, Husband sought a contempt finding against Wife for her failure to make such payments. Husband argued Wife was in breach of contract, and sought interest in excess of $100,000.

In her opposing brief, Wife countered that Husband had cohabitated with her and freely used her vehicles (Husband disputed this) for significant periods during the 25 years since their divorce, and had held out to her that he would not seek payment of the amounts assigned to him in the parties’ 1998 divorce. Wife would not have extended such use of her property absent Husband’s promises, and through said rent-free enjoyment of her property, Husband had received benefits that were even greater in value. Wife argued that Husband’s claim for repayment now was barred by the doctrine of laches, owing to the significant time elapsed during which Husband failed to make any claim for payment, and that payment to him now would be unfairly prejudicial to her.

The trial court agreed, finding that Husband’s claim was barred by the doctrine of laches. Husband appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in finding Wife had established a valid defense of laches.

Limiting its review to plain error, the Court affirmed the trial court’s findings: Husband’s delay, when he was fully aware of Wife’s receipt of pension payments and cohabitating with her without contributing to household expenses, was clearly unreasonable. Further, Wife relied on Husband’s assurances in extending the use of her home and vehicles to her, and payment of the 1998 assignment now would thus be prejudicial to her.

Jackson v. Jackson, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 21 DR A 08 0478, 23 CAF 10 0095, 2024-Ohio-3134

Marital Property: 529 plan, equitable division, de facto date, debts, financial misconduct, loan (401(k)), retirement benefits, separate property

Dated: August 16, 2024
Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part, and Remanding

Throughout the parties’ 25-year marriage, spending and budgeting remained a source of disagreement, with Husband providing Wife an ‘allowance’ and budget for family affairs that she found unrealistic and frustrating. In 2015 or 2016, Wife left the home, returning only after Husband promised to relax his restrictions on spending. In 2021, Husband again ‘cut off’ her access to marital income, and she once again moved out. Husband subsequently filed for divorce in August of 2021, and sought a de facto marriage termination date of 05/01/2021.

The trial court issued a mutual restraining order, proscribing both parties from the dissipation, withdrawal, or transfer of marital assets. In August of 2022, during the pendency of the divorce, Husband effectively liquidated two accounts and took a loan from his 401(k) to purchase a lot on which he planned to construct a home.

During proceedings in 2023, the parties’ testimony included disputes over expenditures by Wife from 529 accounts established for the parties’ children, and Husband’s allegations that Wife had mismanaged money allocated to her for their household budget. While Wife’s expenditures from the 529 accounts had been related to the children’s schooling, Husband alleged that Wife had not sought permission to use the accounts, and further questioned the wisdom of many of the transactions.

The icy heart of it all.

Husband also testified as to Wife’s spending of money he’d provided to her for personal use, as well as money allocated for family expenses. For the latter, Husband argued Wife had spent $233,559 in excess of what he deemed reasonable from January 2017-May 2021. Husband argued that, during this time, Wife should have also saved or invested the $44,000 he’d provided to her for personal use following their earlier 2016 separation. Wife countered that Husband had withheld money during that time that he used freely, for other expenses, such as significant payments to and purchases for his brother, mother, and aunt, and the funding of a university endowment. Wife’s expenses, on the other hand, she alleged were strictly for family needs, and she countered that Husband’s expectations for her budget were unreasonable. Wife was unable to save or invest the $44,000 given to her for personal use, because she was compelled to spend it on home repairs, family needs, and vacations for the family.

The magistrate subsequently issued findings as to Husband’s purchase of the lot and financial misconduct, and Wife’s reasonable, discretionary spending. Husband’s objections to the magistrate’s decision were filed one day late, and were thus found untimely when the trial court adopted the decision. Husband appealed, citing numerous assertions of error.

Noting Husband’s failure to demonstrate “good cause” for his delay in filing objections, the Court found that the trial court’s designation of them as untimely was not in error.

Husband further argued that trial court-adopted, magistrate entry erroneously stated that the parties had not stipulated to the values of retirement accounts such his pension and numerous others, and erred in its use of different valuation dates for their division. Trial courts have discretion to use differing valuation dates as needed, the Court wrote, provided they adequately explain the reasoning, as the trial court had done here. The Court found that the trial court did not, however, adequately explain why it did not include the stipulated values of the accounts in the judgment entry. The Court thus remanded back to the trial court to address the narrow issues of whether the parties’ stipulation as to the account values would impact their division and valuation date.

Husband also alleged that the trial court ‘double counted’ $33,000 in funds used for his lot purchase in 2021. Noting his failure to make timely objections, the Court relied on the trial court as being in the best position to assess witness testimony and factual disputes. Further, the Court noted, Husband’s financial misconduct over the lot purchase could have entitled Wife to a distributive award. The Court thus affirmed.

Husband next asserted that the trial court erred when it failed to deem the parties’ 529 accounts as marital assets, or factor them into the marital property equalization payment. The Court again disagreed, finding that “there is no clear-cut rule that 529 plans must always be classified as marital assets,” and noting both parties’ testimony that the funds were intended for the children’s schooling. Further, the Court again noted its inability to conduct a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence review, owing to Husband’s untimely objections.

As to the $50,000 loan from his 401(k), Husband argued that the trial court erred when it deemed it his separate debt while also finding that the lot it was used to purchase was marital property. The Court again affirmed, noting Husband’s own proposal that each party should be responsible for debt in their name. The Court likewise affirmed the trial court’s financial misconduct finding as related to the loan, noting again that Husband’s failure to make timely objections precluded a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence review.

The Court likewise rejected Husband’s assertions related to Wife’s expenditures from the children’s 529 accounts, noting Husband’s access to said funds, and finding that unilateral use of 529 funds does not in itself represent financial misconduct. Husband’s arguments were also dismissed as to: the division of an HSA account; Wife’s use of the $44,000 provided to her for separate use; Wife’s use of separate accounts established for her and the children’s use; and Wife’s alleged overspending in the 4-5 years of marriage. Husband failed to make timely objections, limiting the Court’s review, and the determination of witness credibility must be the province of the trial court.

Shaw v. Shaw, 12th Dist. Butler No. DR98040692, CA2023-08-091, 2024-Ohio-3231

Civ R. 60(B): mistake
Marital Property: equitable division
QDRO: abuse of discretion, ambiguity, impermissible modification, merely implements decree, postmortem, survivorship
ORC 3105.151(I): prohibition on modification

Dated: August 26, 2024
Reversing and Remanding

As part of the parties’ 1999 divorce, Wife was awarded a share of Husband’s federal employee pension, equal to half the pension with cost-of-living adjustments, a former spouse survivor annuity (with costs of this split between the parties), and a provision entitling the parties’ children to her share of the annuity should she predecease Husband. Wife began receiving her share of the pension the following year.

At the time of her death in 2022, Husband received a letter notifying him of the benefit’s payment to the parties’ children. Husband subsequently filed a Civ. R. 60(B) motion to vacate the existing order, arguing it improperly modified the terms of the decree. (Editor’s note: This decision refers to the order assigning CSRS or FERS benefits as a ‘QDRO,’ though under federal regulations such an order is referred to as a Court Order Acceptable for Processing, or ‘COAP.’) The parties’ son opposed the motion.

At a subsequent hearing, Husband alleged he had not read the order prior to signing it, and would not have agreed to the terms concerning the succession of benefits to the parties’ children. The parties’ son also testified, stating that Wife had spoken about this succession of benefits to him prior to her death, that he and Husband had not been on speaking terms since the divorce, and that he had left his job to care for Wife near the end of her life.

The magistrate ultimately found in favor of Husband, and the trial court adopted their findings. The previous order was judged void, and a new order was directed to be prepared. The magistrate found that Husband was entitled to relief under Civ. R. 60(A), for clerical error.

The parties’ son appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Husband Civ. R. 60 relief from judgment, and erred in its finding that the original order did not conform with the terms of the decree.

The central issue here is whether the QDRO's provision allowing [Wife’s] share of [Husband’s] pension benefits to pass to their children upon her death constitutes an impermissible modification of the divorce decree or a permissible clarification of it. [The parties’ son] contends that the QDRO is consistent with the decree's intent and ensures that [Wife] receives her full "one half" of the pension for the duration of [Husband’s] lifetime. [Husband] maintains that the QDRO added benefits for their children that were not contemplated in the divorce decree.

Reaffirming that QDROs and analogous orders merely implement the terms of a decree, the Court considered both parties’ arguments. Because the decree provisioning below stemmed from the parties’ agreement, the trial court was permitted to clarify any ambiguity therein.

[Wife] shall receive one half of [Husband’s] pension with the U.S. Postal Service. A separate qualified domestic relations order shall issue to effectuate this division, and the court reserves jurisdiction to correct any defects in wording.

The magistrate, in their review of these terms, did not find them ambiguous and thus found that the original order constituted an improper modification thereof. The Court disagreed, finding “ample room for clarification without straying into impermissible modification.” The original order, the Court continued, “aligns squarely with the divorce decree’s language and the principles of equitable division that underpin marital-property law.”

The pension provision in the divorce decree is ambiguous on all the matters addressed in the QDRO. On the question of what happens if [Wife] predeceases [Husband], the decree can reasonably be interpreted to mean that pension payments cease or that they continue. The provision must be interpreted and clarified, which is what the QDRO does. By providing a continuation of benefits to the parties' children, the QDRO does not give [Wife] any additional benefits.

Further, the Court noted, Husband had signed the original order in 2000, and had ample opportunity to review its terms prior to his 2022 motion. Not only was Husband’s delay unreasonable, the result of granting his claim would be substantially prejudicial. The Court was unmoved by Husband’s alleging he had not read the order before signing it.

Finally, the Court found that a finding in favor of Husband held potential to unsettle many similar cases with relatively concise decree language. The Court thus affirmed.

Todor v. Ballesteros-Cuberos, 12th Dist. Butler No. DR 2022 07 0498, CA2024-02-025, 2024-Ohio-4525

Marital Property: gift, separate property (real estate, pension), tracing

Dated: September 16, 2024
Affirming

The parties married in 2006 and began divorce proceedings in 2022. Conflicting claims arose concerning an apartment owned by Wife in Serbia, and a pension fund and bank account held by Husband in Spain. Following a hearing, the trial court awarded Wife her apartment as her separate property, and found that Husband’s pension fund and bank account were marital property.

Husband appealed, arguing first that the trial court erred in its determination that Wife’s apartment was her separate property. The Court disagreed: Wife’s mother testified during the proceedings that she had purchased the apartment as a gift to Wife, and Wife produced records corroborating this. The Husband argued the apartment was marital property due to his contributions to its upkeep but failed to present evidence that altered its classification as a gift.

In his next assignment of error, Husband alleged that the trial court erred in its designation of his bank account and pension fund as marital property. Husband claimed the pension fund, established before the marriage, was funded solely by his mother, but provided no documentary evidence tracing these contributions. Similarly, he offered no evidence to establish the separate nature of the Spanish bank account.

While it is undisputed that the pension fund was established in 2005, predating the parties' 2006 marriage, [Husband’s] claim that his mother funded the pension fund lacks any corroborating evidence beyond his own testimony, which itself lacks much specificity. There is a notable absence of documentary evidence demonstrating his mother's deposits into his bank account or subsequent transfers to the pension fund. Undoubtedly, this is why the trial court, in its written decision, characterized [Husband’s] evidence of his mother's cash contributions to the pension fund as "less than compelling."

Finding Husband failed to meet the burden of proof for his separate property claim, the Court again affirmed.

Uecker v. Uecker, 9th Dist. Summit No. DR-2006-02-0491, 30794, 2024-Ohio-4566

Contempt
Marital Property
QDRO: ambiguity, impermissible modification

Dated: September 18, 2024
Affirming

As part of marital property division in the parties’ 2007 divorce, Wife was awarded 100% of Husband’s pension benefits under the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, effective as of the date of decree. A QDRO effectuating the assignment of Wife’s interest was entered in October 2007.

Husband commenced benefits in 2021, under the Legacy Credit Pension, a pension plan created after the parties’ divorce, the eligibility for which was based in part on his employment during the marriage. Wife subsequently filed a motion for contempt, and requested an order awarding her 100% of his benefits and the entry of an amended QDRO.

The trial court held a hearing with expert testimony from both sides, following which it found Husband was not in contempt and awarded Wife 20% of the pension benefits. Wife’s appeal followed.

In her first assignment of error, Wife argued that the trial court committed error and abused its discretion by modifying the parties’ separation agreement when it failed to award her 100% of the Legacy Credit Pension benefits. The Court disagreed, holding that the Legacy Credit Pension was not contemplated by the parties during the divorce and the trial court’s decision was thus a permissible clarification, and not a modification of the decree. The parties’ separation agreement only applied to benefits in existence at the time of the divorce.

On appeal, [Wife] does not develop any extensive argument explaining how the trial court abused its discretion in the distribution of the Legacy Credit Pension if the trial court was correct in its determination that the Legacy Benefits did not exist at the time of the divorce and were not contemplated by the parties in entering into the separation agreement. Instead, her argument is limited to an assertion that the separation agreement provided for the distribution of the Legacy Credit Pension thereby entitling her to the entirety of the Legacy Benefits. As discussed above, her argument is incorrect, and she has not otherwise demonstrated the trial court abused its discretion in its ultimate determination.

In her second assignment of error, Wife alleged that the trial court erred and abused its discretion when it failed to order payment from Husband of the funds received from the Legacy Credit Pension. Based on its rejection of her first assignment, the Court again affirmed.

McGrady v. Camara, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. DR-06-313690, 113502, 2024-Ohio-4903

DOPO: equalization, impermissible modification, merely implements decree
Marital Property: retirement benefits (OPERS)

Dated: October 10, 2024
Affirming

The parties divorced in 2006, at which time Husband was awarded the marital home, and Wife was awarded a 50% share of Husband’s OPERS pension, based on a marital end date of 05/18/2007. Though Wife executed a quitclaim of the deed to Husband, no DOPO was ever entered.

The parties subsequently remarried in 2008, primarily for insurance purposes, and divorced once again in 2015. The 2015 decree incorporated its own separation agreement that included provisions related to spousal support, but no division of property. The parties’ house was designated Husband’s premarital property, and no mention was made of the OPERS pension.

In 2021, Wife received notification of Husband’s application for retirement from OPERS, with a request for a copy of the 2006 decree. She approached Husband to execute a DOPO for entry with the Court, but he refused. Wife filed a motion in 2022, which the trial court treated as a motion to show cause for failure to comply with the 2006 order to prepare a DOPO. Husband filed a brief in opposition, arguing that the 2006 decree was superseded by the parties’ remarriage and 2015 decree.

In 2023, the trial court granted Wife’s motion and held Husband in contempt for his failure to execute the DOPO. Husband’s subsequent objections and supplemental objections were dismissed, and his appeal followed.

Husband argued that the trial court erred when it granted Wife’s motion, and that the prior agreement was superseded by the 2015 decree. He asserted that the pension division was executory and voided by the parties’ remarriage. Noting a lack of caselaw on the effect of post-decree reconciliation, the Court rejected Husband’s argument, finding that the 2006 decree was an executed provision, not an executory provision. Such provision, the Court wrote, was not subject to modification or nullification by the parties’ remarriage.

The DOPO, like a QDRO, is merely an enforcement mechanism to implement the division outlined in the decree. Further, the Court noted, it would be inequitable for Husband to retain his award of the house from the 2006 decree, while Wife loses the award provided to her in the same order.

Because the 2006 Divorce decree gave Wife a share in the pension, the parties would have had to agree in writing to modify the 2006 Decree to change the division of property. Absent express language indicating her intent to transfer ownership of her share of the pension, Wife retains her share of the pension.

Finally, to the extent Husband challenged the 2006 award on equity grounds, he had relinquished such grounds for appeal by not raising these considerations at that time. The Court thus affirmed.

Sorrentino v. Louis, 12th Dist. Butler No. DR23-02-0111, CA2024-03-047, 2024-Ohio-4957

Marital Property: gift, life insurance

Dated: October 15, 2024
Affirming

Husband and Wife married in 2020, separated in May 2022, and initiated divorce proceedings in August 2022. Husband suffered from terminal cancer at the time of the divorce, and removed Wife as beneficiary from his life insurance policy. When the parties subsequently reconciled, Husband not only reinstated Wife as a beneficiary on the policy but transferred its ownership to her outright. When their reconciliation failed a few months later, Husband unsuccessfully sought the return of policy ownership from Wife, and filed for divorce.

At a hearing in October 2023, Husband argued that the transfer of the policy to Wife had been conditioned on the parties’ reconciliation, which he claimed was her requirement at the time. Wife denied having made any such demand, and said that Husband had suggested the transfer to alleviate her financial concerns. Noting Husband’s previous career as a financial analyst, the trial court found that he was perfectly capable of understanding the irreversibility of his actions. The trial court found that the transfer of Husband’s policy to Wife constituted an inter vivos gift to her, and awarded the policy to Wife as her separate property.

Husband appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its determination that the transfer was an inter vivos gift. Applying the manifest weight of the evidence standard, the Court found no error in the trial court’s classification of the policy.

The elements of an inter vivos gift, the Court wrote, are intent, delivery, and acceptance, all of which were present in this case. Gifts made during a marriage are presumed irrevocable unless explicitly stated otherwise at the time of the transfer, and the assignment itself made no mention of reconciliation or any similar conditions.

We have no doubt that assignment of the policy to Wife was part of an effort by the couple to salvage their marriage. However, the fact that effort was unsuccessful changes nothing. The record, specifically the Absolute Assignment, makes clear that assignment of the policy was not made expressly contingent on the parties reconciling at the time it was executed.

Kontur v. Kontur, 5th Dist. Guernesy No. 23 DR 108, 24CA000008, 2024-Ohio-5201

Marital Property: gift, separate property, tracing

Dated: October 29, 2024
Affirming

Prior to the parties’ marriage, Husband acquired three parcels of land, including one from his father which housed the marital residence. Prior to trial in 2023, the parties stipulated to the value of said residence and its joint ownership. The parties were unable to agree on the separate versus marital property classification of the three parcels, and the trial court ultimately deemed them Husband’s separate property, and awarded Wife an amount representing her interest in mortgage payments made during the marriage. Wife’s objections were overruled, and her appeal followed.

In her appeal, Wife argued that the trial court erred in its separate/marital property determinations, and in denying her request to introduce appraiser testimony.

Noting Husband’s ownership of the properties prior to the marriage, and relatively straightforward record of financing and mortgage payments made during the marriage, versus the paucity of evidence presented for Wife’s claims of improvements and contributions made during the marriage, the Court rejected Wife’s arguments.

As for Wife’s assertion that Husband gifted her an interest beyond the mortgage paydown awarded her at trial, the Court again disagreed.

We find competent, credible evidence in the record to support the trial court’s determination. First, [Husband] acquired the parcels prior to the marriage, with parcel 141 being purchased in 1979 by [Husband’s] father. Furthermore, both parties testified that the properties were transferred from [Husband] to joint and survivorship deeds for the sole purpose of estate planning. [Husband] did not transfer the properties with donative intent.

Finally, as to the appraiser’s testimony, the Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wife’s request at trial. The parties had already stipulated to the value of the parcels, and “[i]t is well-settled that when parties enter into a stipulation of facts, those facts are binding on both the trier of fact and the parties themselves.”

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